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Abstract
Different governments focus on different parts of the existing World Trade Organization rules
as posing opportunities for their producers to expand trade if the rules were relaxed or eliminated.
While this may be understandable, it is the premise of this Essay that such an approach, if pursued, would result in slower trade liberalization, not increased liberalization, as those segments
of industry perceiving that the existing equilibrium is not to their advantage are given no options
other than to oppose further liberalization. When, as in agriculture, domestic politics can threaten
the survival of governments, liberalization without strong rules can only be slow liberalization.
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INTRODUCTION
The multilateral trading system is highly successful in expanding market opportunities for many sectors within agriculture and manufacturing because it recognizes the need for internationally-agreed upon rules that permit countries to address
problems in an agreed-upon manner as markets are opened.
Historically, the question has not been whether countries will
agree to expand trade opportunities in an environment without
rules. Few, if any, countries would consider such an approach
desirable or workable. Rather, the issue has been what rules are
needed for countries to have the confidence to liberalize their
economies, particularly import sensitive sectors, so as to achieve
overall benefits. "Most Favored Nation" (or "MFN") and "National Treatment" are two important principles/rules that give
trading nations the confidence that trade will not be discriminatory. Rules on government subsidies and on injurious dumping
have given countries assurance that their producers will win or
lose on the basis of underlying competitive strength, not based
on the deep pocket of a treasury or the artificial price signals
created by dumping. Similarly, countries have been able to tell
their producers and workers that should liberalization result in
serious dislocations, temporary relief would be available to regroup or permit an orderly retreat from the market under Article XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
(or "GATT") and the Agreement on Safeguards. Indeed, within
the United States, organized labor's historic support for trade
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liberalization was premised upon the availability of such safeguard options to prevent massive dislocations. As a result, every
major trade agreement entered into by the United States since
1942 includes a safeguard provision, and the safeguard concept
in U.S. law is found in principles identified in 1934.1
During the Uruguay Round, there were efforts to bring historically sensitive sectors-agriculture and textiles-fully under
the traditional GATT rules. Because of the sensitivities and/or
peculiarities of these sectors, certain transitional provisions were
included to allow countries to address potential politically unacceptable inequalities. Thus, for example, importing countries
agreed to the full integration of textiles and apparel into the
GATT/World Trade Organization 2 (or "WTO") system at the
end of a ten year phase-in period, as long as there were special
transitional safeguard provisions.3 In agriculture, where many
products are perishable and have a short shelf life and others are
deemed to be politically sensitive, special safeguard provisions
were permitted in limited circumstances to give more automatic
adjustment rights.4
Not surprisingly, different governments focus on different
parts of the existing rules as posing opportunities for their producers to expand trade if the rules were relaxed or eliminated.
While this may be understandable, it is the premise of this Essay
that such an approach, if pursued, would result in slower trade
liberalization, not increased liberalization, as those segments of
industry perceiving that the existing equilibrium is not to their
1. See Trade Agreements Act of 1934, ch. 474, §1, 48 Stat. 943 (1934). That statute
planted the seeds of American safeguard policy in stating that the expansion of foreign
trade would serve
[Als a means of assisting in the present emergency in restoring the American
standard of living, in over-coming domestic unemployment and the present
economic depression, increasing the purchasing power of the American public, and in establishing and maintaining a better relationship among various
branches of American agriculture, industry, mining, and commerce..
Id.
See also 2 THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992), at 1730-31
(Terence P. Stewart, ed.) (1993) [hereinafter UR TREATISE].
2. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-REsuLTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].

3. See Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 6, WTO Agreement,
Annex 1A, at http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legal-e/final-e.htm.
4. See Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 5, WTO Agreement, Annex
1A, at http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legal-e/final-e.htm.
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advantage are given no options other than to oppose further liberalization. When, as in agriculture, domestic politics can
threaten the survival of governments, liberalization without
strong rules can only be slow liberalization.
Let us look at a number of areas where rules need to be
revisited, maintained, or added.
Rules That Need to be Revisited:
Rules That Need to be Maintained:
Rules That Need to be Added:

* Safeguards

*
e
e
9
e

Dispute Settlement
Anti-dumping
Subsidies
Perishable agriculture
Structural excess capacity

Rules are the lifeblood of liberalization. As a new round of negotiations is pursued, hopefully the WTO Members will ensure a
structure of rules that will permit maximum trade liberalization.
I. RULES TO BE REVISITED
A. Safeguard Agreement
Every system needs a safety release valve to handle situations
where too much pressure has been brought to bear on some
part of the system. In the multilateral trading system, the product-specific safety release valve has primarily been contained in
Article XIX of the GATT, 5 and, since the Uruguay Round, in the
Agreement on Safeguards. 6 There has also been a safety release
valve for countries in toto in exceptional situations-the balance
of payments provision.7 Special provisions have also existed for
developing countries under Article XVIII. s Moreover, some issues have been viewed as too sensitive to be trumped by trade
objectives (Article XX, public health, morals, etc.), at least where
the action at issue is not a disguised trade restraint.
Article XIX of the GATT 1947 provided for "Emergency Action on Imports of Particular Products." Paragraph 1 (a) of the
Article provides:
5. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, art. XIX, WrO
Agreement, Annex IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1,
33 I.L.M. 1154 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994].
6. See Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, at
http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legale/finale.htm [hereinafter Agreement on
Safeguards].
7. See GATT 1994 art. XII.
8. See GATT 1994 art. XVIII.

2000]

OPPORTUNITIES IN THE WTO

If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of
the obligations incurred by a contracting party under this
Agreement, including tariff concessions, any product is being
imported into the territory of that contracting party in such
increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or
threaten serious injury to domestic producers in that territory
of like or directly competitive products, the contracting party
shall be free, in respect of such product, and to the extent
and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy
such injury, to suspend the obligation 9in whole or in part or
to withdraw or modify the concession.
While the threshold for action was high, the concept was very
much to encourage countries to participate in the liberalization
activity by assuring participants that tools existed to deal with a
crisis in any particular industry affected. As stated in the GATT
Activities 1988 review of the Safeguards negotiations taking place
in the Uruguay Round:
The GATT's draftsmen, in the 1940s, realized that governments would be unwilling to accept far-reaching obligations
to reduce and stabilize obstacles to trade unless they were allowed certain limited "escapes" from its general principles.
Article XIX is one such "escape clause" and the actions it permits are usually referred to as "safeguards" measures.' 0
Hatters Fur,an early GATT challenge to a U.S. escape clause
action, upheld the U.S. action and suggests that a reasonable
construction of Article XIX is possible by countries implementing the Article that would allow problems to be addressed when
they arise. 1
Nonetheless, whether because of the administrative requirements that Article XIX suggested or the need for more effective
tools, GATT Contracting Parties took a variety of actions that
9. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT 1947].
10. See GATT 1947, GA TT Activities 1988, at 44 (1989).
11. In Hatters Fur, members of the Working Party determined that "unforeseen
developments" should be interpreted to mean developments occurring after the negotiation of the relevant tariff concession. It would not be reasonable to expect that the
negotiators of the country making the concession could and should have foreseen all
possible developments at the time when the concession was negotiated. See Report of the
Intersessional Working Party on the Complaint of Czechoslovakia Concerningthe Withdrawal by
the United States of a Tariff Concession under Article XIX of the GATT, GATT/CP/106 (Oct.
22, 1951) [hereinafter Hatters Fur].
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were not specifically authorized under Article XIX, particularly
in textiles and clothing.1 2 While the textile sector's problems,
identified in the 1950s and 1960s, resulted in the Multifibre Arrangement (or "MFA"), it has taken decades for textiles and
clothing to be fully integrated into the international trading system. Indeed, complete integration is not scheduled until the
end of 2004.1'
Similarly, Article XIX of GATT 1947 contains the concept of
a balance of rights and obligations after any action by a Member,
meaning either compensation to trading partners affected by a
safeguard action or the potential for retaliation against exports
for the country taking action.1 4 Since GATT Contracting Parties
were not able to take safeguard actions only against selected
countries, compensation could become prohibitive even though
only one or a few countries were causing market difficulties.
While the concept of a balance of rights makes sense since no
unfair trade practice is alleged, it also made a country's use of
the safeguard right very difficult regardless of the state of extremis
being faced by the domestic industry seeking relief. For many
countries, it became important to find ways to get relief without
having to pursue formal safeguard procedures and remedies. As
explained below, this need resulted in countries turning increasingly to the use of "grey-area" measures.
Approximately 130 Article XIX invocations or notifications
have occurred since 1947. This number is small in comparison With the number of relief measures adopted by countries.
When due to political ramifications, the use of Article XIX is
impracticable, Contracting Parties have resorted instead to
the use of "grey-area" measures-measures taken that are not
part of articulated GATT rights and obligations. Grey-area
measures have emerged as an attractive option because countries can negotiate these types of measures outside of GATT
rules or disciplines (although such actions are arguably challengeable under Articles XXII and XXIII). One of the other
perceived "advantages" of grey-area measures is the lack of
compensation or retaliation with grey-area measures. Moreover, grey-area measures may be imposed in fact for extended
12. See GATT Doc. L/1374 (1960), reprinted in GATT, 9th Supp. BISD 106 (1961).
13. See Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 9, WTO Agreement, Annex IA, at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal_e/final_e.htm.
14. See GATT 1947 art. XIX, para. 3a.
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periods of time. These agreements include Orderly Market-

ing Arrangements ("OMAs"), Voluntary Restraint Agreements ("VRAs"), and other bilateral arrangements. Export
restraint agreements have been used to cover such important
trade areas as automobiles, consumer electronic products,
steel and steel-related products, agricultural products, textiles
and footwear. The legal status of these measures has never

been formally clarified by the Contracting Parties. While attempts have been made since the beginning of the Tokyo
Round in 1973 to specify rules that will cover these measures

in the General Agreement, no rules were in place as of the
end of the Tokyo Round.
Grey-area measures, in numbers exceed the total "escape

clause" actions under Article XIX. According to a 1991
GATT source, as of early 1991, only twenty-four Article XIX
actions were in force. See Table 1 (listing Article XIX actions
in effect as of early 1990). In comparison, 284 grey-area

agreements were known to be in force. See Table 2 (breaking
down grey-area measures by product as of December 1990).
According to GATT sources, approximately forty percent of
these arrangements have been in effect since 1985; and sixty

percent of15the existing arrangements have no explicit expiration date.
During the Uruguay Round, countries were at last able to
conclude an Agreement on Safeguards.' 6 The Agreement implementing Article XIX of GATT 1994, prohibits "grey-area"
measures, permits limited selectivity in certain circumstances,
encourages adjustment, and reduces the cost of taking safeguard
action by prohibiting retaliation if relief is in place for three
years or less. 7 A good test for the trading system is whether
15. UR TREATISE, supra note 1, at 1725-26.
16. Under GATT 1947, safeguards were regulated only by Article XIX, and it was
the Uruguay Round that created the SG Agreement, which adds clarity and introduces
certain changes. The SG Agreement was negotiated in large part because GATT Contracting Parties had been increasingly applying a variety of so-called grey area measures
(bilateral voluntary export restraints, orderly marketing agreements, and similar measures) to limit imports of certain products. These measures were not imposed pursuant
to Article XIX, and thus were not subject to multilateral discipline through the GATT,
and the legality of such measures under the GATT was doubtful. The Agreement now
clearly prohibits such measures, and has specific provisions for eliminating those that
were in place at the time the WTO Agreement entered into force. See World Trade
Organization, Goods: Rules on trade remedies at www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis-e/
eol/e/default.htm (discussing historical background to Agreement on Safeguards).
17. See Agreement on Safeguards art. 9.
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countries are able to address highly disruptive trade surges
within the system now that the WTO and the Agreement on
Safeguards are in operation. If not, the trading system will face
significant reluctance by participants to engage in further trade
liberalization on a multilateral basis, will see the rise of "greyarea" measures despite their prohibition, or will experience a serious rupture as individual countries are not able to withstand
the trading pressure in politically-sensitive sectors.
In examining pre- and post-WTO safeguard activity, several
facts must be kept in mind. Many developing countries undertook relatively few tariff bindings prior to the Uruguay Round or
were long-term users of balance-of-payment ("BOP") exceptions. 18 In contrast, developed countries typically had reduced
most industrial tariffs to very low levels over the various rounds
of trade negotiations. 9 Developed countries also were not users
of BOP exceptions. 20 Because the major developed countries
had historically focused on each other during tariff negotiations,
some developing countries enjoyed tariff liberalization in developed countries because of the "most-favored-nation" rights/obligations of the GATT without making significant tariff bindings
and tariff reductions in their own country. 21 This "free rider"
situation halted during the Uruguay Round, as developing country Members of the WTO undertook tariff bindings and reduction obligations on nearly all industrial and agricultural goods.2 2
Still, some developing countries maintain some tariff flexibility
as tariff bindings (even after reductions) are at levels above applied rates in 1993, meaning that they could raise tariffs to some
extent on particular products without resorting to Article XIX.
At the same time, countries that were long-term users of balanceof-payment exceptions were asked to reassume their obligations
or to justify continuation of the BOP measures, with significant
pressure to phase out the temporary restraints. 23 Finally, many
countries that were not Members of GATT prior to the Uruguay
18. See UR TREATISE, supra note 1, at 396.
19. See id., at 385-458.
20. For a discussion on GATT articles XII and XVII (BOP provisions), see id., at
1859-1875.
21. See id., at 386.
22. See generally WTO Agreement vols. 2-26, 28-30, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994). These
volumes contain the individual member tariff bindings and reduction obligations.
23. See UR TREATISE, supra note 1, at 1874-1875.
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Round joined the WTO. Most of the new Members are developing countries, so there are significantly more developing country
Members today than there were under the GATT.
Because most industrial tariffs are relatively low in developed countries, one would expect that safeguard actions in such
nations would flow from large dislocations in demand patterns.
Illustrative examples include the collapse of demand in the former Soviet Union; financial crisis in Southeast Asia and the resulting contraction in demand in a number of important countries; severe recessions; and dramatic change in exchange rates.
Similarly, this effect could be the result of liberalization in those
sectors that have historically enjoyed significant tariff and other
protection (e.g., parts of agriculture). Because developing countries have, on average, much higher levels of tariffs than do developed countries, one would expect developing countries to become more avid users of the safeguard provisions as tariff bindings expose domestic producers in developing24countries to their
first serious challenges from imported goods.
From 1947 through 1988, the following nations brought 112
of the over 130 total Article XIX cases brought within the GATT:
Australia (38), United States (27), European Communities (25),
and Canada (22).25 This amounts to three to four actions per
year globally, nearly three of which were from these four major
developed countries or groups of countries. By contrast, the
2000 annual report of the WTO Safeguard Committee (Annex
2) shows the following number of safeguard cases brought under
the WTO since 1995:
24. As shown by the table below, developing countries generally continued to
maintain higher average tariffs even after the Uruguay Round.
Trade-Weighted Average Tariffs for Industrial Goods
Pre-Uruguay Round

Post-Uruguay Round

Developed countries

6.3%

3.9%

Developing countries

15.3%

12.3%

8.6%

6.0%

Countries in transition

Source: Schott, Jeffrey J., The Uruguay Round: An Assessment (Institute for
International Economics, 1994) at 61 (Table 7). The above rates for
developing countries are based on bound, not applied, rates. Id.
25. See GATT, GATT AcrIVITIES 1988, at 44 (1989).
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35 cases
5 cases 26
10 cases

Thus, developed countries now represent only 20% of safeguard
cases (fewer than two per year) while developing countries now
account for 70% of safeguard activity (six to seven per year).
WTO Members continue to impose "grey-area" measures on
non-WTO Member countries. For example, China's accession
protocol (draft) has an annex on measures currently in effect
that certain WTO Members will phase out over a particular period of time 2 7 and the press has reported that Mexico and China
are negotiating over the phase out of Mexico's coverage of 1400
Harmonized System ("HS") categories of imports under its
dumping law under procedures that would not have been appropriate had China been a WTO Member at the time. 2 ' For WTO
26. The following countries have brought safeguards cases since 1995:
Developing countries:

Argentina (3); Brazil (1); Chile (4); Colombia
(1); Ecuador (2); Egypt (3); El Salvador (2);
India (11); Korea (4); Morocco (1); Venezuela

(3).
Countries in transition:

Czech Republic (1); Latvia (1); Slovak Republic
(2); Slovenia (1).

Developed countries:

Australia (1); United States (9).

See Report (2000) of the Committee on Safeguards, G/L/409 (Nov. 23, 2000) at 8-12.
27. See Working Party on Accession of China, Draft Report of Working Party on
Accession of China to the WTO, WT/ACC/SPEC/CHN/1/Rev. 4 (Oct. 24, 2000); see
also China ProvidesNew Trade Data as Accession Talks Recommence, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Sept.
15, 2000.
28. In November 2000, Mexico and China met to continue negotiations on the
terms of a bilateral agreement prior to China's accession to the WTO. A primary focus
of discussions was the status of Mexico's existing anti-dumping duty orders applicable to
imports from China. As reported by the Chinese press:
In April 1993, Mexico carried out anti-dumping investigations on thousands of
products exported from China and levied duties on them ranging between 16
and 1,105 per cent of the actual value of the product. So far, more than 1,000
products are still on the Mexican anti-dumping list, according to Long, noting
that this goes against the basic principles of the WTO.
The Mexican side said it needed a transitional period to smooth away the difficulties facing its domestic businesses.
In consideration of this, China has agreed that Mexico's anti-dumping arrangement, which violates WTO rules, can be phased out gradually, Long said.
Mexico Not Likely to Hinder WTO Bid, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 11, 2000,
www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndydb/2000/1 ldl-lwto.bl8.html.

at
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Members, however, the Safeguards Agreement required that all
"4grey-area" measures be eliminated or brought into conformity
with the Agreement' by the end of 1998, with Members afforded
an opportunity to select one measure that could be maintained
until the end of 1999. 29 Only the European Community ("EC")
exercised the latter option, maintaining restraints on Japanese
automobiles that expired at the end of 1999.0
The increased use of the Agreement on Safeguards by developing countries (and others) is a positive development. It is simply not realistic to assume that trade liberalization can go on at a
significant pace without some significant dislocations and the occasional need for regrouping in particular sectors. The activity
level for 140 nations (nine to ten cases per year) is almost certainly too low if other restraints are not being used by countries.
It is unclear whether the relatively low usage rate is due to (a)
difficulties for most Member nations in implementing their
rights and complying with their obligations, (b) constructions of
WTO rights and obligations by WTO panels and the Appellate
Body, or (c) other reasons. What is certain is that the direction
taken by the panels and Appellate Body, to date, is discouraging
use of Article XIX and the Agreement on Safeguards. The result
will be predictable-a slowdown in liberalization efforts within
the multilateral context (already seen in the slowness of progress
towards a new Round within the WTO) and/or a search for new
bilateral solutions outside of the system.
It is not the function of this Essay to review in depth the
decisions of individual panels or the Appellate Body. Whether
the constructions of the panels and the Appellate Body have
29. See Agreement on Safeguards art. 11.2.
30. See Agreement on Safeguards art. 11.2. As noted by the WTO Secretariat:
Article XIX safeguard measures in effect when the WTO Agreement came into
force must end not later than eight years after they were first applied, or by the
end of 1999, whichever is later. Grey area measures in existence when the
WTO came into force must be brought into conformity with the Agreement
on Safeguards, or removed according to a notified timetable, ending not later
than 31 December 1998. Each member was given the right to maintain a single notified measure for one year longer, to 31 December 1999. For the European Communities, the measure concerned was specified in an annex to the
agreement, and consists of restrictions on imports of Japanese cars and light
commercial vehicles. That is, and will remain, the sole example of this exception, as no other member exercised its right to nominate a similar measure
within the time limit of 90 days after the entry into force of the WTO.

WTO

SECRETARIAT, GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS 109 (1999).
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been correct or not, the four panel decisions and three Appellate Body decisions make the Safeguard provisions harder to use
and hence less likely to be used. Indeed, all of the panel proceedings that have gone to report and all of the Appellate Body
decisions have found each safeguard action reviewed to violate
some WTO obligations. 1
Despite the fact that most GATT, and now WTO, Members
viewed the "unforeseen developments" provision of Article XIX
of GATT 1947 and GATT 1994 to have been a dead letter for a
number of decades and to have been carefully avoided in the
Agreement on Safeguards, the Appellate Body has breathed life
back into the concept by requiring governments to make a finding on the matter. Since no subsequent decision has defined the
parameters of what can be found to be an "unforeseen development," it is unclear whether this issue alone will make the Agreement on Safeguard largely unusable. Certainly, for developing
31. The following are the safeguard panel reports and AB decisions that have been
issued:
Case

Panel Report

Appellate Body
Report

Korea-Definitive Safeguard Measure on
Imports of Certain Dairy Products, WT/DS98

WT/DS98/R
(June 21, 1999)

WT/DS98/AB/R
(Dec. 14, 1999)

Argentina-SafeguardMeasures on Imports of
Footwear, WT/DS121
United States-Definitive Safeguard Measures
on Imports of Wheat Gluten from the EC, WT/
DS166

WT/DS121/R
(June 25, 1999)
WT/DS166/R
(July 31, 2000)

WT/DS121/AB/R
(Dec. 14, 1999)
WT/DS166/AB/R
(Dec. 22, 2000)

United States-SafeguardMeasure on Imports of WT/DS177/R
WT/DS178/R
Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb from New
(Dec. 21, 2000)
Zealand, WT/DS177 and United StatesSafeguard Measure on Imports of Lamb Meat
from Australia, WT/DS178
A number of other cases have been initiated although some have been abandoned as
safeguard actions have terminated or have not been pursued (excluding transitional
safeguard cases under the Textiles Agreement):
" United States-Definitive SafeguardMeasures on Imports of CircularWelded Carbon
Quality Line Pipefrom Korea, WT/DS202.
" Chile-PriceBand System and Safeguard Measures Relating to CertainAgricultural
Products from Argentina, WT/DS207.
" Hungary-SafeguardMeasure on Imports of Steel Productsfrom the Czech Republic,
WT/DS159.
" United States-SafeguardMeasure Against Imports of Broom Corm Broomsfrom Colombia, WT/DS78.
• Colombia-Safeguard Measure on Import of Plain Polyester Filamentsfrom Thailand, WT/DS181.
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countries, it will be hard to argue that trade expansion is not
foreseeable at the time of negotiations when they move from
high tariffs to significantly lower tariffs. The message for developing countries, if the panels and Appellate Body place significant emphasis on this aspect of safeguard actions, will be to hold
off on further trade liberalization moves or to seek other tools to
address the problems particular sectors face.
The concern that should exist within the WTO is that collectively the positions taken by those challenging safeguard actions
seek a construction of the Agreement that would make it an extraordinary event that any country could ever bring a safeguard
action. If the complainants are successful in their efforts, they
will have effectively sealed the system off from effective pressure
release in particular sectors. They will collectively share the responsibility for slowing the pace of trade liberalization or for encouraging the misuse of other provisions (e.g., SPS measures,
standards, etc.).
Actions needed by the WTO include a reopening of the
Safeguards Agreement to clarify the requirements so as to be
sure that the Agreement can be used exactly when it should be
available. This may require a clarification that "unforeseen developments" are not required going forward or a set of examples
of what would constitute unforeseen developments that would
make the concept workable for the types of situations likely to
arise. Emergency action should be available when needed. Creating artificially onerous burdens to the use of safeguard measures will disserve the trading system, not promote it. Consider
the experience of the United States at the time of adoption of
the current U.S. safeguard law in 1974:
From 1951 through 1962 the escape clause worked reasonably well. The criteria were fair and equitable, and relief was
occasionally granted. However, in 1962 the Administration
proposed and the Congress adopted rigid and stringent tests
of injury and causal relationships between tariff concessions,
increased imports and serious injury.
As a result, the provisions of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962
for invoking the escape clause (like the adjustment assistance
provisions also adopted in that Act, which contained similar
injury tests) have proven to be an inadequate mechanism for
providing relief to domestic industries injured by import
competition. One result of this inadequacy has been a num-
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ber of special "voluntary" agreements for industries deemed
by the Congress or the Executive to be suffering from excessive imports. The Committee believes it is better to provide a
fair and reasonable test for any industry which is being injured by imports-a determination made by an independent
factfinding body, such as the International Trade Commission-than to rely on ad hoc agreements for a few select industries .32
Similarly, Members of the WTO must be concerned that the
construction of what is required in an investigation and in a published report of the investigation is manageable by all Members.
A review of panel reports often suggests a requirement of detail
in investigation reports that may be unreasonable to expect all
Members to be able to satisfy. For example, in Korea-Definitive
Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products3 3 ("KoreaDairy"), the Appellate Body determined that for Members to
meet their notification requirements in safeguard cases, they
must, at a minimum, address all items listed in Article 12.2 and
Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards.3 4 Thus, under Arti32. Senate Report No. 93-1298, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. 119 (1974). Labor groups in
the United States have traditionally supported trade liberalization as long as adequate
and effective safeguards remain in place to address emergency situations. For example,
in testimony before the Senate Finance Committee considering the Trade Expansion
Act of 1962, George Meany, President of the AFL-CIO, stated:
As its name implies this bill proposes to increase the volume of America's foreign trade. We endorse that objective. We endorse it because this increased
trade will strengthen the unity of the free world and promote the cause of
democracy in the newly established or less developed nations in Africa, Asia,
and Latin America.
We also endorse it because increased trade will stimulate the economic growth
of the United States-if the safeguards provided in the bill are retained ....
[W]e, in the AFL-CIO have consistently supported the various extensions of
the Reciprocal Trade Act over the last 28 years....
We must be clear eyed in facing the problem of imports.... We could talk for
days about the broad, general benefits of foreign trade; the many jobs it creates compared to the few jobs it costs; the tastes, and more important, the
needs of our people that only imports can satisfy....
Even so, we can't ignore the workers, the industries and the communities that
suffer the consequences of increased imports.
HearingsBefore the Senate Finance Committee on the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, H.R. 11970,
Part I at 23941 (July 24, 1962) (statement of George Meany, President American Federation of Labor).
33. See id.
34. See Korea-DefinitiveSafeguardMeasure on Imports of CertainDairy Products,Appellate Body Report, WT/DS98/AB/R (Dec. 14, 1999) [hereinafter Korea-Dairy].
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cle 12.2, Members must provide the Committee on Safeguards
with all pertinent information including "evidence of serious injury" or threat thereof caused by increased imports, a precise
description of the product involved and the proposed measure,
the proposed date of introduction, and the expected duration
and timetable for progressive liberalization. These requirements
should not be onerous to supply.
However, the Appellate Body in Korea - Dairy added that:
What constitutes "evidence of serious injury" is spelled out in
Article 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards which provides:
The competent authorities shall evaluate all relevant factors
of an objective and quantifiable nature having a bearing on
the situation of the industry, in particular, the rate and
amount of the increase in imports of the product concerned
in absolute and relative terms, the share of the domestic market taken by increased imports, changes in the level of sales,
production, productivity, capacity utilization, profits and
losses, and employment."
The Appellate Body, moreover, noted that the list of factors in
Article 12.2 and Article 4.2 were not exhaustive and the Committee on Safeguards could request additional information if necessary. As collecting the type of information listed in the provisions can be quite difficult for investigating authorities on many
sectors of the economy (if for no other reason, when industries
are highly fragmented and there are no trade association data
normally collected or available), the Appellate Body decision
may over time constitute a barrier to the use of safeguard provisions because of lack of resources or data sources within countries.
Similarly, in Argentina-SafeguardMeasures on Imports of Footwear 6 ("Argentina-Footwear"), the Appellate Body went on to
state that under the "serious injury" requirement of Article
4.2(a), the competent authorities were required to evaluate, "at
a minimum, each of the factors listed in Article 4.2(a) as well as
others that are relevant to the situation of the industry concerned." And, again, in United States-Wheat Gluten from the European Communities3 7 ("Weat Gluten"), the Appellate Body held
35. Id. at 33.
36. Argentina-Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear, Appellate Body Report,
WT/DS121/AB/R (Dec. 14, 1999) [hereinafter Argentina Footwear].
37. United States-Wheat Gluten from the European Communities, Appellate Body Re-
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that competent authorities may not limit their evaluation of "all
relevant factors" under Article 4.2(a) to the factors that interested parties raise, but rather, "[t]he competent authorities
must, in every case, carry out a full investigation to enable them
to conduct a proper evaluation of all relevant factors expressly
mentioned in Article 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards."
It is suggested that panels and the Appellate Body need to
take a more practical approach to the problems of investigating
authorities or the WTO will need to modify the agreement language to be sure meritorious cases are not prevented because of
evidentiary standards that become prohibitive.
B. Dispute Settlement
In 1988, the U.S. Congress declared that one of the "principal trade negotiating objectives" of the United States was a more
automatic and predictable dispute settlement process where
time delays could be reduced and countries would bring their
activities into compliance.3 8 In contrast, a major negotiating objective for many of the trading partners of the United States was
to constrain the United States and make it operate within the
system-more specifically, to curb the ability of the United States
to unilaterally determine, under Section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974, that U.S. commercial interests have been harmed by the
acts of its trading partners. 9 The system has worked fairly well
from the perspective of most Member nations who would agree
with Article 3.2 of the DSU that "[t] he dispute settlement system
port, WT/DS166/AB/R (Dec. 22, 2000) [hereinafter Wheat Gluten]. Although the Appellate Body reversed the panel's analysis and conclusions regarding causation of injury, it found nevertheless that the U.S. International Trade Commission had not established an adequate causal link between increased imports and serious injury to the
domestic industry. Id. In conclusion, the AB determined that the U.S. safeguards measure on wheat gluten from the EC was inconsistent with the Safeguards Agreement. Id.
38. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Title I at Section
1101(b) (1), P.L. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1121 (Aug. 23, 1988); 19 U.S.C. § 2901(b)(1):
The principal negotiating objectives of the United States with respect to dispute settlement are-(A) to provide for more effective and expeditious dispute settlement mechanisms and procedures; and (B) to ensure that such
mechanisms within the GATT and GATT agreements provide for more effective and expeditious resolution of disputes and enable better enforcement of
United States rights.
Id.
39. See Terence P. Stewart & Mara M. Burr, The W'O's First Two and a Half Years of
Dispute Resolution, 23 N.C.J. INT'L & COM. REG. 481, 485-86 (1998).
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of the WTO is a central element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system." 40 Nevertheless,
there have been some, perhaps, unanticipated developments
that have put pressure on the system, for example: (1) the publicity of "wins" or "losses" and the need to demonstrate that the
system is working for a country as well as against it, (2) the power
being wielded by the panels and Appellate Body is not easily
checked regardless of Members' perceptions that the panels are
overstepping, or creating new rights and obligations, and (3)
other possible problems in particular cases.
What follows is a partial list of topics that should be examined by the WTO as part of a new Round or otherwise.
1. Capacity of the system for disputes, and the implications
for panelists, for Appellate Body Members, and for the
budget needs;
2. Lessons learned from the first six years and modifications
to the system that would promote speed and efficiency
while preserving Member rights;
3. Whether Members are in fact being judicious in their selection of disputes, including adherence to Article 3.7 of
the DSU ["Before bringing a case, a Member shall exercise
its judgment as to whether action under these procedures
would be fruitful"];
4. Since the real parties in interest are often non-governmental entities, whether the system should be modified to permit greater participation and protection of private-party
interests;

5. Whether panels and the Appellate Body should be using a
different standard of review in evaluating cases; and
6. Whether a mechanism is needed to permit challenges of
actions by the Appellate Body where perception of overstepping authority exists (not for resolution of the underlying dispute but for future disputes).
Let's consider these six areas in dispute settlement and the
concerns raised by some for reform. As of the end of 2000, there
have been 216 requests for consultations involving 165 distinct
40. Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 3.2, WTO Agreement, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS
OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1127 [hereinafter Dispute Settlement
Understanding or DSU].
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matters-or an average of thirty-six requests per year.4 ' This is a
substantial increase from the GATT system, which generated approximately ten requests for consultations per year.4 2 The WTO
system does not envision that all requests for consultations will
result in the need for formal dispute settlement proceedings
through the request for a panel. Many matters have been resolved through consultations,4 3 although countries tend to pursue the panel process more quickly under the WTO than was
true under the GATT. During the first six years of the WTO,
there have been a total of forty-five panel reports and Appellate
Body decisions (excluding reports resulting from proceedings
pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU, which have totaled six to
date), with eighteen active cases as of December 13, 2000."4
Stated differently, during the first six years, there have been an
average of seven to eight panel and Appellate Body decisions
each year. While there has been a pick-up in the volume of decisions rendered, the number remains small compared to the volume of matters handled by national courts. The U.S. Court of
International Trade, for example, publishes several hundred de41. World Trade Organization, Overview of the State-of-Play of W'O Disputes at
www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue/dispue.htm.
42. Under the WTO's DSU, the workload of the WTO dispute settlement system
has been greatly expanded in comparison to the workload of its predecessor, the GATT
dispute settlement system. Counts of the total number of disputes addressed under the
GATT differ, but Professor Jackson estimates that over its existence (1948-1994), the
GATY system handled about 500 disputes.
It is interesting to note some of the statistics about cases brought under the
GATT system. There are various inventories. The GATT Analytical Index
through January 1995 contains 196 cases, but seems not to include most cases
for which no panel report was issued (usually because parties settled). It also
does not include cases under the separate Tokyo Round codes. A GATT document in March 1994 notes 306 disputes contained in the GATT secretariat's
official inventory. Hudec's 1993 book analyses 207 complaints. Another
rough inventory that I compiled for many years includes many cases noted
from some informal sources, including some that were never brought as a
formal complaint. The disputes in this list number 418 to about mid-1994.
Thus it seems plausible that in some sense the GATT system has handled over
500 disputes since its inception.
JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 120 (2nd ed., 1997). Thus, where the GATT system dealt with
about 10-11 case filings per year on average, the WTO system is handling about 35-36
complaints each year on average. Id.
43. BetweenJanuary 1, 1995 and December 13, 2000, 36 cases were settled or inactive. See World Trade Organization, Overview of the State-of-Play of WO Disputes, at
www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue/dispue.htm.
44. See id.
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cisions a year, although many are not on the merits. Even
though the number of panel and AB decisions is relatively small,
the system is straining under the existing load, and there is every
indication that the caseload will increase, not decrease, in the
years ahead.4 5 Many countries that have not traditionally been
complainants are developing internal capabilities or hiring
outside counsel to permit them to bring cases if for no other
reason than the domestic public relations need to demonstrate
that the WTO permits them to be plaintiffs as well as defendants
in particular matters.
There are significant problems in finding panelists who are
acceptable to the disputing parties.46 Selection issues delay the
start of panel proceedings and result in a slowing of the dispute
settlement process. Some Members, including the European
Union, are urging adoption of a permanent group of panelists
similar to what exists on the Appellate Body, but with a base
group larger than seven. 4 v
Service on the Appellate Body is becoming increasingly time
consuming as an increasing percentage of panel reports are appealed.4" Appeals give the losing party additional time before
conformance is required and permit governments to tell their
constituents that they have done everything possible to maintain
the measure in question. The heavy caseload at the Appellate
Body, however, draws into question the ability of the Appellate
Body Members to handle the assignment on a part-time basis
and without relocating to Geneva. Obviously, any change in the
nature of the assignment will result in a change in the pool of
eligible Appellate Body Members. Similarly, the burden on Appellate Body Members increases when the collegiality require45. As of December 13, 2000, there were 80 pending consultations and 18 active
cases before the WTO. See Overview of the State-of-Play of WO Disputes, at http://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/disp_e/dispu-c.htm.
46. In cases where the parties cannot agree on panelists within 20 days of the establishment of the panel, Article 8.7 of the DSU authorizes the Director-General to appoint the panelists. See DSU art. 8.7.
47. See Terence P. Stewart & Amy A. Karpel, Review of the Dispute Settlement Understanding: Operation ofPanels, 31 LAw & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 593, 611 fn. 86 (2000), citing EU
OutlinesProposalsfor Changes to the WTO Dispute Settlement System, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Oct.
30, 1998, at 12.
48. If parties to the dispute do not agree with the Panel's determination, they may
appeal the panel report to the Appellate Body within 60 days of its circulation to the
public. See DSU art. 16.4. Third parties may not appeal the panel report although they
may make written submissions to the Appellate Body. See DSU art. 17.4.
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ments mandate the review of all cases by each Member, even
though a panel of three Members is charged with the decisionmaking responsibility.4 9 Moving the Appellate Body in the direction of traditional appellate courts would let seven Members
handle more work. The price, however, might be the uniformity
in construction that the collegiality approach presumably sponsors.
Because Member nations of the WTO have an interest in
having documents translated into all official languages, there are
serious delays in the release of panel reports as the WTO's limited translation capabilities struggle with the increased requirements. 50 Moreover, because panel reports typically run hundreds of pages in length and reflect all arguments made by all of
the parties, the process, even when personnel are available, is
time consuming and costly. Efforts have been made by some
countries to limit the contents of the panel report and not to
require translation of all of the parties' underlying documents if
such documents are included as attachments instead of being
folded into the report itself. To date, some countries have been
unwilling to permit a deviation from the requirements of full
translation into all three official languages. With a limited
budget and many Member nations unable or unwilling to significantly increase the budget to address increased capacity needs,
translation alone can add months to the dispute settlement process. This process will presumably become more cumbersome as
more cases are decided and as the official language list grows
over time. New countries that become Members will presumably
press for adding languages typically included in other multilateral agreements as official languages, such as Chinese, Russian,
and Arabic.
Similarly, the review by Members of the dispute settlement
rules and procedures prior to the Seattle Ministerial Meeting
identified a host of technical issues5 1 the resolution of which
49. To ensure consistency and coherence in decision-making, all Appellate Body
Members meet on a regular basis to discuss matters of policy, practice and procedure.
See Working Proceduresfor Appellate Review, WT/AB/WP/1, at para. 4(1) (Feb. 15, 1996).
Moreover, Appellate Body Members receive all documents filed in an appeal and Members remain informed on dispute settlement activities and other relevant activities of
the WTO. See id. at para. 4(2).
50. For a discussion on problems with the timeliness of translating panel reports,
see Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting, WT/DSB/M/46, at 15 (Aug. 6 1998).
51. See U.S., WfO Members Spilt Over How to ChangeDSUat Seattle, INSIDE U.S. TRADE,
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could
(1) expedite proceedings (e.g., existing right to block request for a panel once; whether requests for panel must
be in sequential meetings); and
(2) clarify existing ambiguities (e.g., how to preserve the
right to compensation or retaliation while, at the same
time, permitting resolution of whether changes by a
member bring the country into compliance with its obligations).
While it appeared likely that resolution of this package of modifications was going to occur in Seattle, the difficulties that arose
on the overall launch of a new Round prevented closure on the
reforms identified from the review process.5 2
To prevent the system from bogging down with disputes, to
permit issues between nations to be addressed by less formal
means where possible, and to be sure that disputes are not pursued where there are no realistic expectations that the dispute
will permit a solution, WTO Members are supposed to exercise
restraint when resorting to the dispute settlement system. Some
of these self-restraint notions can be seen in the DSU itself.5 3 In
fact, it is far from clear whether all, or most of, the major Members are showing self-restraint. Looking at the number of disputes and the stage at which complaints are registered in some
cases suggests otherwise.5 4 So do discussions with delegations in
Geneva which suggest that, for national political reasons, they
need to have the ability and record of bringing actions to show
that the system is working for their countries (a circumstance
usually present where a country has been a defendant in another
case which was lost). Developing countries have been conNov. 26, 1999; see also Proposed Amendment of the Dispute Settlement Understanding,Communicationfrom Canada, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Ecuador, the European Communities and its
member States, Hungary, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Slovenia, Switzerland,
Thailand and Venezuela, WT/MIN(99)/8, (Nov. 22, 1999).
52. See DSU Review Faces Substantive, Procedural Challenges After Seattle, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Dec. 24, 1999.
53. See DSU art. 3.7.
54. Two examples: (1) Canada's case on U.S. countervailing duty law as it pertains
to "export restraints," and (2) the request by the EU, Japan and six other members for
consultations on the so-called U.S. "Byrd Amendment" before the provision had been
implemented or made operational. See United States-Measures TreatingExport Restraints
As Subsidies, Request for Consultations by Canada, WT/DS194/1 (May 19, 2000); Press
Release, European Union, U.S. Anti-Dumping Scheme: EUJoins WTO Partners in call
for consultations (Dec. 22, 2000) (on file with author).
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cerned about the number of cases filed by the United States on
TRIPs and TRIMs issues when requests were pending for blanket
extensions of time. 55 Korea and other countries expressed concerns about cases in which developed countries file cases where
there is little economic interest in fact by the complainant (e.g.,
the EU challenge of a Korean safeguard action on dairy products; the U.S. challenge of the EU banana regime). Similarly,
there is a feeling among some Members that challenges are being filed, through the panel process, in an effort to win those
matters which countries were unable to win through negotiations, despite the admonition that "recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obliga56
tions provided in the covered agreements.
With the inability of losing countries to block panel reports
or Appellate Body decisions and with the expanded jurisdiction
of the WTO as compared to the GATT, certain Members are
under significant pressure from the private sector-whether
businesses, workers, environmentalists, consumer groups or
others-to make the system more transparent, subject to rights
of participation by those who view their interests as being directly affected, and, generally, to make the system more democratic. While environmentalists and some consumer groups receive much of the media attention on NGO concerns with WTO
decision making, particularly in the dispute settlement process,
other groups are deeply concerned over the lack of rights when
their economic interests are directly affected by disputes
brought to and heard by the WTO. Businesses and workers that
seek access to foreign markets or seek the use of national laws to
provide conditions of fair trade or temporary import relief are
not allowed to participate in consultations or hearings or even to
have briefs considered by the panel or Appellate Body (although
amicus curiae briefs are, at least theoretically, permissible and
have been permitted in very limited circumstances).5
55. "TRIPs" refers to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RE
SULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994). "TRIMs" refers to the

Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement,
Annex IA, at http://www.wto.org/english/docs.e/legal_e/final-e.htm.
56. See DSU art. 3.2.
57. See United States-Import Prohibitionof CertainShrimp and Shrimp Products, Report
of the Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle]. In
Shrimp-Turtle, the Appellate Body concluded that panels may use relevant information
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Moreover, different countries pursue different approaches
to private sector participation and representation. Some governments perceive that they do not have the internal capacity to
handle some or all of the disputes that they are involved in and,
consequently, will retain outside counsel who will prepare briefs,
make oral arguments, and generally control the approach taken
(subject, of course, to government agreement).58 Paid for by the
domestic industry affected, outside counsel have been involved
in the matter on behalf of the private sector for some time prior
to the dispute. In such situations, the private sector is substantially represented by its counsel in fact. By contrast, other countries may try to handle all aspects of the dispute internally, although they may be willing to receive input from private sector
parties. The real parties in interest may not be deputized and
may not be able to attend hearings. They will seldom be able to
defend the real party-in-interest's position during the proceeding other than indirectly. Not surprisingly, there is often discontent by those believing that their client's interests are not being
adequately represented by the government position.
While NGOs push hard for more open proceedings (including public access to the hearings, the right of private parties to
submit amicus curiae briefs, etc.), there is strong resistance from
many Member nations. Such nations perceive NGOs (by definition, not Members of an intergovernmental organization) as
seeking rights that exceed those of Members (which cannot participate where third-party rights are not timely asserted) and
(whether it be requested or non-requested) to make an informed decision. Panels are
given the authority to decide what information and technical advice they will consider
in making their objective determination of the case. Thus, although amicus curiae briefs
are accepted, it is up to the panel to decide what weight to give to such briefs.
58. See European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distributionof Bananas, Report of the Panel, Complaint by Ecuador, WTIT/DS27/R/ECU, Report of the
Panel, Complaint by Guatemala and Honduras, WT/DS27/R/GTM, Report of the
Panel, Complaint by Mexico, WT/DS27/R/MEX, Report of the Panel, Complaint by
United States, WT/DS27/R/USA (May 22, 1997) [hereinafter EC-Bananas]. In EC-Bananas, the Appellate Body stated:
[W]e can find nothing in the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization (the "WTO Agreement"), the DSU or the Working Procedures, nor in customary international law or the prevailing practice of international tribunals, which prevents a WTO Member from determining the composition of its delegation in Appellate Body proceedings . .. it is for a WTO
Member to decide who should represent it as members of its delegation in an
oral hearing of the Appellate Body.
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complicating the ability of governments to resolve matters amicably between themselves. 59 Although it has been in the forefront of those nations pushing for increased transparency and
access for the private sector, the United States routinely does not
deputize the private sector and is one of the countries capable of
handling matters internally without using the services of outside
counsel.
Another issue, particularly with respect to rules, is whether
the standard of review used by panels and the Appellate Body is
the proper one, at least where administrative records and fact
finding are involved. Case law established that the special rule
included in dispute settlement cases involving anti-dumping
matters 6° is not applicable to other unfair trade disputes such as
countervailing duty matters.6 1
The spate of decisions in Safeguards, Subsidies and Antidumping agreements cases also raises questions about the
proper role of panelists and Appellate Body Members in reviewing cases and drawing answers from what are, typically, limited
portions of the overall record. Few panelists in rules decisions
have any experience either as an administrator or as a practitioner in the types of matters being reviewed and hence have
little knowledge of the real world conditions in which investiga59. Although the United States has been a strong advocate of transparency in the
WTO, other countries have pressed only for limited changes in transparency. See, e.g.,
U.S. Rides Solo on Key WFO External Transparency Proposals, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Oct. 20,
2000. While the US believes that WTO committee meetings and DSB hearings should
be opened to the public, and that amicus briefs from NGOs should be accepted in DSB
proceedings, the EU and Australia propose more limited proposals such as de-restricting documents and holding annual meetings and symposia to incorporate the input of
outside groups. Id.
60. The Anti-dumping Agreement provides a specific standard of review for the
panel to follow in dumping cases. Article 17.6(i) states that:
[I]n its assessment of the facts of the matter, the panel shall determine
whether the authorities' establishment of the facts was proper and whether
their evaluation of those facts was unbiased and objective. If the establishment
of the facts was proper and the evaluation was unbiased and objective, even
though the panel might have reached a different conclusion, the evaluation
should not be overturned.
Anti-dumping Agreement art. 17.6(i).
61. See United States-Imposition of CountervailingDuties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and
Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originatingin the United Kingdom, Report of the Appellate
Body, WT/DS138/AB/R (May 10, 2000) [hereinafter US-Lead Bismuth Steel]. In US-Lead
Bismuth Steel, the Appellate Body agreed with the panel that Article 17.6 applied only to
disputes under the Anti-dumping Agreement, and that it did not also apply to the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.
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tions are conducted under tight internationally-agreed timelines. Records in these cases typically run to thousands of pages
and, in some jurisdictions, can run to hundreds-of-thousands or
even millions of pages. Those who use the rules under national
law have expressed at least two concerns about the standard of
review currently in place: (1) that it permits reviewing bodies to,
essentially, substitute their judgment as to what the facts are or
show (despite the fact that the panelists did not hold factual
hearings, conduct verification, or question the industry participants), and (2) that it allows panels to create constructions of
obligations that flow from silence in the agreements. Moreover,
it makes little sense to apply one standard of review to certain
administrative investigations but another standard to other administrative investigations where there is no inherent or distinguishing difference in the conduct of the administrative proceedings that would justify disparate standards.
Additionally, there appears to be little consideration for
whether or not the interpretations adopted, and the requirements deemed existing on Members, are reasonable from an administration perspective. If countries which have administered
these types of laws for decades, with their highly-developed and
sophisticated approaches to handling investigations, are repeatedly found to be doing so improperly and are further found to
be providing insufficient justification for their actions, what
hope is there for the many Members setting up systems for the
first time which have neither the infrastructure in place nor the
resources to conduct investigations at the same level of thoroughness? And what of those which have smaller staffs in the
agencies administering their laws? As noted above, fully 70% of
Safeguard actions in the first six years have been brought by developing countries. The rules must work not only for the developed countries but for developing countries, least developed
countries, and countries in transition. Yet, to date, no rules challenge (other than an initial case where transition rules indicated
the case was brought in the wrong forum) has failed. Apparently
all countries are unable to administer laws in a manner consistent with their agreements. This record indicates that something is seriously wrong.
Finally, a number of countries expressed concerns over actions taken by the Appellate Body that appear to exceed the
scope of its authority yet remain unsusceptible to review by the
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Members. The flap that has been created by the Appellate Body
decision to authorize amicus curiae briefs would be one example
of such a situation.6 2 Another example would be an early decision by the Appellate Body in which, because it lacked remand
authority, it essentially applied facts to its construction of the law
on a matter that had not been resolved by the panel.63
Members will obviously embrace the current resolution of
some of the above issues while being concerned about others.
The breadth of the challenge in the dispute settlement system to
address the needs of Members and their constituencies suggests
that much needs to be done, and soon, on the dispute settlement system.
II. RULES THAT AEED TO BE MAINTAINED
A. Anti-dumping
Article VI of the GATT 1947 (same language in GATT 1994)
addresses anti-dumping and countervailing duties. As stated in
Article VI:1:
The Contracting Parties recognize that dumping, by which
products of one country are introduced into the commerce
of another country at less than the normal value of the products, is to be condemned if it causes or threatens material
injury to an established industry in the territory of a contracting party or materially retards the establishment of a domestic industry.
The terminology "is to be condemned," found in Article
VI:I of the GATT 1947 and now GATT 1994, is the harshest language in the GATT, although some practices (e.g., export subsidies) are prohibited. While developed countries have historically been the major users of anti-dumping laws, consistent with
the relatively high percentage of imports subject to tariff bindings in developed countries and relatively low percentage of
bindings in many developing countries, as more developing
countries undertake significant market liberalization, they have
found need to have national laws implementing the WTO rights
for fair trade conditions represented by Article VI when price
62. See, e.g., Daniel Pruzin, W/'O Appellate Body Under Fire For Move on Acceptance of

Amicus Briefs,

INT'L TRADE DAILY,

Nov. 27, 2000.

63. See Canada-CertainMeasures Concerning Periodicals, Report of the Appellate
Body, WT/DS31/AB/R (June 30, 1997).
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discrimination by imports has caused material injury to their domestic industries.
Anti-dumping laws originated in Canada at the turn of the
last century, and, later, were enacted in South Africa, Australia,
the United States and parts of Europe by the 1920s." 4 The antidumping provisions of Article VI, the various anti-dumping
Codes, and now, the Agreement implementing the provisions of
Article VI have been important elements in the willingness of
countries to liberalize, as they provide some assurances that communities, companies and their workers will not be destroyed by
false market signals.
While the use of anti-dumping laws is controversial in some
circles, historically, relatively small volumes of trade have been
addressed by anti-dumping cases at any given time (typically less
than one or 2% for the major users)." During the Uruguay
Round of trade negotiations, countries negotiated a very detailed agreement to implement Article VI, although some issues
of importance to countries needing to use anti-dumping laws
have not been resolved, such as the problem of circumvention.
There has now been, at most, five to six years of experience
under the modified national laws. One sees a growing use of the
law by non-traditional users. This should be good news to supporters of the rule of law and a liberalized trading system. Typically, there are relatively few cases brought by any particular
country, and the cases cover a relatively small portion of trade.
Concerns about compliance with the agreement reached
can, of course, be pursued through consultations and dispute
settlement. An increasing number of anti-dumping disputes
have been brought. Subject to the concerns raised in the prior
section on the functioning of the dispute settlement system, se64. See UR

TREATISE,

supra note 1, at 1389-1404.

65. See, e.g., the following statement by former Commerce Secretary William M.
Daley:
In 1998, total U.S. imports were approximately US$900 billion. Only about
US$4 billion of those imports were covered by anti-dumping duty orders.
That means that 0.44% - less than one-half of one percent - of our worldwide
imports were covered. Even if imports covered by countervailing duty orders
were added in, the figure only increases to 0.50%.
William M. Daley, Secretary of Commerce, Before the Senate Finance Committee,
(Sept. 29, 1999), availableat http://www.ogc.doc.gov/ogc/legreg/testimon/106f/daley
0929.htm.
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lected review of decisions is a good thing as it ensures compliance with agreed norms.
For a number of years efforts have been underway to examine certain technical issues, to exchange views on how the issues are addressed by various nations and, hopefully, to reach
some common approaches to construing certain terms. In fact,
since April 1999, the WTO's Ad Hoc Group on Implementation
has discussed six topics with the goal of developing an understanding on these issues.6 6 These six issues are:
1. Practical issues and experience in applying Article 2.4.2;
2. Termination of investigations under Article 5.8 in cases of
de minimis import volume;
3. Practical issues and experience in cases involving cumulation under Article 3.3;
4. Practical issue and experience with respect to questionnaires and requests for information under Articles 6.1 and
6.1.1;
5. Practical issues and experience in providing opportunities
for industrial users and consumer organizations to provide
information under Article 6.12; and
6. Practical issues and experience in conducting "new shipper" reviews under Article 9.5.67
While certain external events (e.g., the financial crisis in
Asia, and the collapse of demand in the former Soviet Union)
have created fundamental equilibrium problems for certain industries which have resulted in a large number of dumping and
countervailing duty actions, the relatively heavy recent use of the
laws to address these phenomena reflects both a satisfaction of
the criteria of Article VI and the Anti-dumping Agreement and
the lack of alternative tools within the WTO to address structural
excess capacity problems, an issue addressed in a later section.
Similarly, while there have been requests as part of the implementation examination within the WTO to rebalance the
agreement by certain countries, there is no demonstration that
any rebalancing is in fact appropriate at this stage. An examination of the use of the agreement since 1995 is illuminating. As of
November 3, 2000, the WTO Committee on Anti-Dumping Prac66. See Report (2000) of the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, G/L/404 (Nov. 8,

2000).
67. See Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices,Note from the Secretariat, G/ADP/W/
410 (Aug. 6, 1999).
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tices reported that some sixty-four Members (the EU being one
Member) notified anti-dumping legislation including the following countries:
Developing countries (46):
Argentina
Barbados
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Cyprus
Dominica
Ecuador
Egypt

El Salvador
Fiji
Ghana
Guatemala
Honduras
India
Indonesia
Jamaica
Kenya
Korea
Malawi
Malaysia

Mauritius
Mexico
Morocco
Nicaragua
Pakistan
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Saint Lucia
Senegal

Singapore
South Africa
Thailand
Trinidad and
Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
Uruguay
Venezuela
Zambia
Zimbabwe

Poland
Romania

Slovak Republic
Slovenia

Japan
New Zealand

Norway
United States

Countries in transition (9):
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Hungary

Kyrgyz Republic
Latvia

Developed and other (9):
Australia
Canada
EC

Iceland
Israel

Source: Report (2000) of the WTO Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, G/L/404 (Nov. 8,
2000).

Twenty-four Members indicated that they do not have an antidumping law:
Bahrain
Burkina Faso
Estonia
Liechtenstein
Mongolia
Suriname

Benin
Chad
Rep. of Guinea
Macau
Namibia
Swaziland

Botswana
Cote d'Ivoire
Haiti
Maldives
Qatar
Switzerland

Brunei Darussalam
Dominican
Republic
Hong Kong
Malta
Sri Lanka
United Arab
Emirates

Source: Report (2000) of the WTO Committee on Anti Dumping Practices, G/L/404 (Nov. 8,
2000).

And, thirty-six Members had not provided notifications:
Albania
Angola
Antigua & Barbuda
Bangladesh
Belize
Burundi
Cameroon
Central African
Rep.
Congo

Dem. Rep. of
Congo
Djibouti
Gabon
Gambia
Georgia
Grenada
Guinea Bissau
Guyana
Jordan

Kuwait
Lesotho
Madagascar
Mali
Mauritania
Mozambique
Myanmar
Niger
Nigeria

Oman
Papua New Guinea
Rwanda
St. Kitts & Nevis
St. Vincent &
Grenadines
Sierra Leone
Solomon Islands
Tanzania
Togo

Source: Report (2000) of the WFO Committee on Anti-DumpingPractices, G/L/404 (Nov. 8, 2000).
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It is known that some countries (e.g., Nigeria) have antidumping laws although not necessarily modified to conform to
the Uruguay Round Agreement while other countries (e.g., Estonia) are in the process of adopting laws. Similarly, some of the
major countries seeking to join the WTO also have anti-dumping
laws in place (e.g., China, Russia, and the Ukraine).
Since the creation of the WTO, there has been a significant
increase in the number of cases brought by developing coun-tries, including cases against other developing countries. For example, a compilation of measures taken (versus cases initiated)
through 1991 showed that Australia, the United States, the EC,
and Canada accounted for just under 90% of all anti-dumping
measures (through 1991, 1621 out of 1841, or 88%).68 Developing countries, by contrast, accounted for just 5.9% of all measures taken. BetweenJuly 1, 1994 andJune 30, 2000, these four
developed country Members (Australia, US, EC, Canada) accounted for 48.6% of the cases brought and 55.8% of measures
in effect on June 30, 2000 (this may overstate the actual percent
since a number of users other than the four historic users did
not report total measures in effect on June 30, 2000).
Developing countries have become the largest users in most
years and accounted for 52.3% of all cases initiated in the last six
years (July 1, 1994 through June 30, 2000).69 Indeed, between
June 30, 1995 and June 30, 2000, reported measures in effect for
the four historic users declined from 660 to 626 and from 79.9%
to 55.8% (in the same period, all developed countries (including
New Zealand, Japan, and Israel in addition to the four other
68. See UR TREATISE, supra note 1, at 1695-97.
69. It should be noted that reference to the number of cases initiated does not
equate to the number of cases that result in orders. A large percentage of anti-dumping initiations do not, in fact, result in the imposition of anti-dumping duties or other
remedial measures. In the United States, for example, over the last 20 years, less than
half of the cases initiated resulted in orders.
[M]ost anti-dumping cases filed have not resulted in the application of duties.
In cases in which a determination was issued, more have been rejected by the
Commerce Department or the U.S. ITC than have been granted anti-dumping
relief.... [F]rom 1980 to 1997, only about 44% of the anti-dumping cases
filed have resulted in the imposition of anti-dumping duties.
GREG MASTEL, ECONOMIC STRATEGY INSTITUTE, ANTI-DUMPING LAWS AND THE

U.S.

ECON-

OMY 104 (1998). In the period 1980-1997, 732 anti-dumping cases were filed. Of that
total, 315 (44%) had resulted in duties being imposed, 17 (2.4%) had resulted in suspension agreements, 383 (53.6%) had been either rejected, dismissed, or withdrawn,
and 17 were still pending (as of 1998). Id. at 30-31.

OPPORTUNITIES IN THE WTO

2000]

Members) went from 684 measures to 643). At the same time,
measures reported by developing country Members of the WTO
(with a number of developing countries not reporting measures
in effect) went from 166 to 494, with South Africa, India and
Mexico all having more measures outstanding by mid-2000 than
Australia and exceeding or being close to the number of measures outstanding in Canada, even though the latter two countries have substantially greater trade flows. The table below reviews the number of cases initiated during the most recent sixyear time period. It shows that thirty-three of the sixty-four
countries reporting anti-dumping laws in place used them.
Anti-dumping Cases Initiated (July 1994 -June 2000)
7/1/95
through
6/30/96

7/1/94
through
6/30/95

7/1/99
through
6/30/00

7/1/98
through
6/30/99

7/1/97
through
6/30/98

7/1/96
through
6/30/97

Australia

18

18

35

22

Canada

11

17

10

8

6

9

EC

49

41

44

26

16

37

1

3

5

7

4

NA

0

0

0

0

Israel
Japan

0

0

8

6

New Zealand

6

4

5

1

9

9

United States

17

43

28

20

16

30

102

126

127

84

59

91

Argentina

23

15

8

18

42

Brazil

17

12

12

19

1

12

Chile

1

0

2

2

4

2

Colombia

3

8

0

1

5

1

Costa Rica

0

1

NA

NA

NA

NA

Ecuador

0

NA

1

NA

NA

NA

Egypt

4

1

5

NA

NA

NA

0

0

0

NA

1

NA

India

26

38

11

20

5

9

Indonesia

13

0

11

9

NA

NA

4

5

5

18

6

3

8

2

0

NA

Subtotal

Guatemala

Korea

6

Malaysia

1

1

Mexico

7

12

8

5

3

18

Nicaragua

0

2

NA

NA

NA

NA

Panama

0

2

NA

NA

NA

NA

Peru

4

5

5

3

4

4
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Philippines

4

3

1

2

0

NA

Singapore

0

0

0

0

0

2

11

32

23

11

14

Thailand

0

0

0

1

0

0

Trinidad & Tobago

0

5

0

NA

NA

NA

Turkey

0

7

0

5

0

2

Venezuela

0

10

7

0

5

1

118

159

107

116

90

69

Czech Rep.

1

2

NA

NA

NA

NA

Poland

0

3

NA

NA

NA

Slovenia

0

1

NA

NA

NA

Subtotal

1

6

1

NA

NA

NA

TOTAL

221

291

235

1200

1149

South Africa

Subtotal

1
NA

9

1160

Sources: Report (2000) of the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices,G/L/404 (Nov. 8, 2000);
Report (1999) of the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, G/L/340 (Nov. 1, 1999); Report
(1998) of the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, G/L/268, (Nov. 5, 1998); Report (1997)
of the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, G/L/204 (Nov. 6, 1997); Report (1996) of the
Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, G/L/123 (Oct. 29, 1996); Report (1995) of the
Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, G/L/34 (Nov. 14, 1995).

Countries typically bring cases against major trading partners, which obviously varies by country and region. Because the
United States, for example, is the major exporter to both Canada and Mexico (accounting for 75.6% of imports into Mexico
in 1996 and 67.5% of imports into Canada in 1997), although
the number of cases is small for the volume of trade between the
countries, it is not surprising that a fair proportion of Mexican
(eleven of fifty-three initiations) and Canadian (eleven of sixtyone) cases are against imports from the United States. Similarly,
Argentina's major trading partner is Brazil. Accordingly, it has a
fair number of cases against imports from Brazil (twenty-one of
112 brought in the last six years). The same is true for other
countries. At the same time, where there is significant integration of economies in regional arrangements, there is less need
for cases against imports as tariff barriers are removed (e.g.,
NAFTA countries). When integration is sufficiently deep, countries may forego dumping relief altogether on intraregional
trade (e.g., EU). Countries with significant trade barriers (tariffs, NTBs, etc.) and substantial exports are subject to a larger
number of cases over time.
Generally speaking, many of the major exporters from the
developing world continue to have significantly higher tariff
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rates than do most developed countries and tend to be subject to
somewhat higher levels of trade cases over time. Typically, and
similar to the experience of most developed countries, developing countries with wide open markets, including Singapore and
Hong Kong, are subject to few cases. Very diversified export
platforms will typically see fewer cases than do economies that
are heavily dependent on a limited range of products. Some
items, such as energy, are typically not subject to trade actions
simply because of the need for imports. Hence, regions heavily
dependent upon energy for exports do not have a high incidence of dumping cases brought against their exports.
Countries with economic systems that are significantly statecontrolled or state-driven, or are in periods of transition from
state-controlled to market economies, often find that their producers do not have reliable market signals on true costs of production or existing pricing levels in global markets. In such situations, it is not uncommon for there to be rapid export spurts at
very low prices that disrupt markets in a number of countries.
The largest subject of cases by WTO Members in the last six
years has been, not surprisingly, the People's Republic of
China-163 cases around the world, twenty two to thirty-one
cases per year. The Peoples Republic of China, which enjoys a
rapid expansion of exports across a broad spectrum of products
(China's exports, in total, increased 271.4% from 1990 through
1999 compared to world trade increases of 82.1 %), typically
prices its products far below exporters in any other country and
continues to have substantial state involvement in many elements of the economy.
Because of collapsed demand within the region of the Commonwealth of Independent States (or "CIS") (basically, the former Soviet Union), there have been a high number of cases directed at CIS countries for the volume of overall trade in discrete sectors, usually concerning metals involving Russia, the
Ukraine and other countries from the region. Thus, there have
been 112 cases initiated on non-WTO parts of the CIS with most
cases against imports from the Russian Federation (fifty-two) and
the Ukraine (thirty). Because the Ukraine has been successful
in exporting only a narrow range of products, its exports tend to
both be concentrated in a few HS numbers and increase rapidly
when entered into new markets, usually at very low prices. Thus,
in the last six years, the Ukraine has the highest incidence of
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anti-dumping cases initiated for a given export volume of any
major exporting nation in the world.
Sixty-five cases were brought against WIG Members from
Central and Eastern Europe and those CIS Members that joined
the WTO over the last several years. Consider the following ratios for various regions, showing the average amount of trade (in
millions of U.S. dollars) per anti-dumping case initiated:7 °
Central and Eastern Europe, Baltic States and CIS: 1,209.2/case
" Russian Federation:
•

1,428.8

Ukraine:

399.3

" Kazakhstan:

465.8

" Bulgaria:

676.7

" Hungary:

2,501.5

" Poland:

1712.8

" Romania:

773.2
1,404.4

" Other:
Latin America (Mexico, Central, and South America): 2,582.6/case
" Mexico:

5,943.6

•

Brazil:

1,021.5

" Argentina:

2,916.6

" Chile:

1,301.3

" Other countries:

2,933.5

USA and Canada:

11,119.1/case

" USA:

9,394.8

" Canada:
Western Europe:

23,844.6
9,641.5/case - excluding intra-EU trade: 3,966.1/case
10,333.9

* EU:
-

3,770.8

excluding intra-EU trade:

70. The ratios were calculated as millions of dollars of global trade by the region in
1999 divided by the number of cases initiated against imports from countries within the
region by WTO members between July 1, 1994, and June 30, 2000. The 1999 export

trade data was taken from WTO,

ANNUAL

REPORT

2000,

INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATIS-

164-67, tbl. A-3 (World merchandise exports by region and selected economies,
1989-1999).
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Africa: 3,503/case (only 5 countries have had cases filed; only South Africa
and Egypt face many cases)
0 South Africa:
0 Egypt:
0 Other Africa:

1,214.0
593.2
20,458.5

Middle East: 12,150.0/case
0 Saudi Arabia:
* Iran:

10,100.0
4,050

* Israel:

6,448.5

0 Other:

77,606

Asia: 2,655.8/case
* People's Republic of China:
* Hong Kong:

1,197.2
13,416

* Japan:

7,912.5

* Korea:

1,523.6

0 India:

761.1

0

954.2

Indonesia:

* Malaysia:

3,838.9

0 Taiwan:

2,027.3

* Thailand:

1,242.4

o Australia:
* New Zealand:

7,010.0

* Singapore:
* Other:

4,150.7
12,743.2
6,084.9

World: 4,507.2/case
World (excluding intra-EU trade): 3,420.2/case

The foregoing data are also graphically presented in the chart,
on the following page.
As the foregoing data demonstrates, the frequency of antidumping cases correlates closely with expected behavior. Producers that export aggressively and operate behind closed markets will be subject to. anti-dumping cases more frequently than
exporters operating in highly open markets. The existence of
the anti-dumping remedy provides a strong basis for governments of developed countries, developing countries, and coun-
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tries in transition to support further liberalization of trade in
goods. Producers that perceive that they are losing in the marketplace because of false market signals can address them with
existing rules. The data does not suggest any need to reopen the
Anti-dumping Agreement at the present time. While there was
an increase in anti-dumping activity during the severe financial
crisis in Asia and the Russian Federation (with resulting surges
in the exportation of many product categories), it is exactly the
existence of the remedies under Article VI that prevents internal
pressures from building to the point at which broader restraints
that are not rules-based are sought.
At the same time, there is no demonstrable need for special
treatment for developing countries. There have been almost no
cases against the least-developed countries. Such countries'
trade volumes normally would not qualify under existing antidumping provisions and consequently would face no activity.
Malawi and Zimbabwe, two WTO Members in Africa with smaller
economies against whom cases were brought, faced cases only
from South Africa, a neighboring developing country.
Indeed, seventy-three countries-sixty-nine of which were
developing or least-developed countries within the WTO (and
four of which were either developed (Iceland), a country in transition (Albania), or essentially energy exporters (Oman, Brunei)-have faced no initiation of an action in the last six years.
Of the sixty-seven Members (developed, developing, and in transition) who did face one or more actions, only twenty-eight
(fourteen developed and fourteen developing) faced more than
one case per year. The developed countries were Canada, Australia, Japan, the United States, and various countries within the
EU. The fourteen developing countries against which more
than one case was filed were major developing countries:
Anti-dumping cases: 1995-2000
Developing
Country Member

Number of
cases filed
against Member

Average
Number of
cases per year

1999 Export
Trade Data
(Millions US$)

Average
Appligi
Tariff

Korea

96 cases

16.0 cases

144,745

7.9

Hong Kong

13 cases

2.2 cases

174,408

0

71. The average applied tariff rates listed are derived from the most recent WTO
Trade Policy Review ("TPR") for each country. It should be noted that the average
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Malaysia

22 cases

3.7 cases

84,455

8.1

India

48 cases

8 cases

36,560

35.0

Indonesia

51 cases

8.5 cases

84,455

9.5

Singapore

9 cases

1.5 cases

114,689

1.1

Thailand

45 cases

7.5 cases

58,392

18.4

Turkey

18 cases

3 cases

26,028

12.7

South Africa

23 cases

3.8 cases

26,707

15.1

Chile

12 cases

2 cases

15,616

11.0

Venezuela

7 cases

1.2 cases

19,852

12.0

Brazil

47 cases

7.8 cases

48,011

12.5

Argentina

8 cases

1.3 cases

23,333

13.5

Mexico

23 cases
72
422 cases

3.8 cases
70.3 cases

136,703
993,95473

13.6

TOTAL

Sources: Report (2000) of the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, G/L/404 (Nov. 8, 2000);
Report (1999) of the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, G/L/340 (Nov. 1, 1999); Report (1998)
of the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, G/L/268, (Nov. 5, 1998); Report (1997) of the
Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, G/L/204 (Nov. 6, 1997); Report (1996) of the Committee on
Anti-Dumping Practices, G/L/123 (Oct. 29, 1996); Report (1995) of the Committee on AntiDumping Practices, G/L/34 (Nov. 14, 1995); WTO, ANNuAL REPORT 2000, INTERNATIONAL
164-67, tbl. A-3 (World merchandise exports by region and selected
TRAiEn STAISICS,
economies, 1989-99); and the most recent WTO Trade Policy Reviews for the listed countries.

These fourteen developing countries initiated 161 of the
tariffs were not all calculated in the same manner or on the same basis. The sources
were as follows: WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, TRADE POLICY REvIEw-Korea, 27, WT/
TPR/S/19 (1996) ("simple tariff" average for 1994); WoRLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
TRADE POLICY REVIEw-Hong Kong, China, 26, WT/TPR/S/52 (1998) (applied tariff);
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, TRADE POLICY REVIEw-Malaysia, 41, WT/TPR/WT/31
(1997) ("ad valorem" duties); WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, TRADE POLICY REVIEWIndia, 45, WT/TPR/S/33 (1998)("simple average 'effective' (i.e., applied) m.f.n.
tariff'); WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, TRADE POLICY REVEw--Indonesia, 50, WT/TPR/
S/51 (1998) ("simple average" MFN tariff); WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, TRADE POLICY
REVIEw-Singapore, 35, WT/TPR/S/137 (1996) (average collected rate); WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, TRADE POLICY REVIEw-Thailand, 38, WT/TPR/S/63 (1999) ("simple
average" applied tariff); WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, TRADE POLICY REVIEw-Turkey,
40, WT/TPR/S/44 (1998) ("simple average" MFN tariff); WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
TRADE POLICY REVIEW-South Africa, 41, WT/TPR/S/34 (1998) ("simple average" MFN
import tariff); WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, TRADE POLICY REVIEw-Chile, 43 WT/
TPR/S/28 (1997)(ad valorem tariff based on c.i.f. value); WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
TRADE POLICY REVIEw-Venezuela, 52, WT/TPR/S/27 (1996)(ad valorem tariffs);
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, TRADE POLICY REVIEw-Brazil, 41, WT/TPR/S/21
(1996)("simple average" applied tariff); WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, TRADE POLICY

REVIEw-Argentina, 46, WT/TPR/S/34 (1999) (average applied tariff); WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, TRADE POLICY REVIEW-Mexico, 43, WT/TPR/S/29 (1997)("simple
average" applied MFN tariff).
72. The total number of cases filed against these fourteen developing countries
(422) represents 33.6% of all anti-dumping initiations over the 1995-2000 period.
73. The total value of the 1999 exports of these fourteen developing countries
(US$993,954,000) equals 23.4% of world trade (excluding intra-EU trade).
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422 cases (38.2%) against each other. Cases brought by other
WTO Members that are also developing countries account for an
additional 8% of cases against the fourteen developing countries
mentioned above. This means that 46.2% of all cases filed
against these fourteen developing countries were filed by other
developing countries."4
In addition, developed countries with outstanding orders
for products produced within their borders find the bulk of such
orders to be limited to industries where there are significant excess-capacity problems, such as steel. For example, in the semiannual report submitted by the United States to the WTO antidumping committee, the United States reported that it had fourteen anti-dumping orders outstanding on imports from Korea,
ten of which were steel mill products.7 5 Similarly, one of two
orders for South Africa, one of three for Singapore, four of
seven for Mexico, three of six for India, the only order on Venezuela, two of four for Thailand, all five for Argentina, and seven
of thirteen for Brazil were for steel mill products.7 6 Development of rules on structural excess capacity could dramatically
reduce the cases brought by all countries and, in particular,
cases brought against leading developing countries by developed
countries.
As the WTO's work program moves ahead, the Committee's
work on anti-dumping issues should focus on completing its
work on the open anti-circumvention concerns, continuing review of individual Member laws and regulations to ensure conformance with international obligations, and continuing the
technical work needed to determine different nations' approaches to the construction of the same provisions. An examination of the appropriate type of technical assistance needed for
74. In addition, nearly 30% of the cases filed in the last six years involved countries
who are not WTO members, although many were against countries that are at various
stages of the accession process.
75. Committee on Anti-Dumping, Semi-Annual Report Under Article 16.4 of the
Agreement-United States, G/ADP/N/65/USA (Oct. 6, 2000).
76. Id. at 26-32. See also Committee on Anti-Dumping, Semi-Annual Report Under
Article 16.4 of the Agreement-Europe Communities, G/ADP/N/65/EEC (Aug. 17,
2000) (India, 8 of 14 cases involve steel mill products); Committee on Anti-Dumping, SemiAnnual Report Under Article 16.4 of the Agreement-Canada, G/ADP/N/65/CAN
(Aug. 30, 2000) at 6-8 (cases involving steel mill products: Argentina, 1 of 1; Brazil, 3 of
4; India, 3 of 4; Indonesia, 1 of 2; Korea, 3 of 4; Mexico, 1 of 1; South Africa, 1 of 1;
Thailand 2 of 3; and Venezuela, 1 of 1).
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new user nations will ensure a speedy learning curve and compliance with existing obligations. Reopening the Anti-dumping
Agreement, however, would be premature.
B. Subsidies and CountervailingMeasures
More sensitive to many governments than remedies for international price discrimination is the effort to regulate, in certain circumstances, the actions of nation states or their regional
and local governments in the provision of benefits to businesses.
Governments routinely raise money from a wide variety of
sources for the support of government services and other programs. Many governments encourage the development of industries or regions by addressing economic or physical emergencies.
They also encourage the building of infrastructure, the underwriting of costs of certain foods and medicines to portions of the
population, and many other activities that can result in the provision of advantages for domestic producers over foreign competitors. Governments are frequently torn between their allegiances
to both sides of the issue: wanting the freedom to conduct national policy in a manner necessary to the welfare of the nation
but at the same time, not wanting those domestic producers
which participate in international commerce to be disadvantaged due to the deep pockets of other governments. Thus, nation states provide both a wide array of subsidies themselves and,
for more than one hundred years, remedies to address adverse
effects from subsidies provided by others. For example, sugar
subsidies provided by the Russian government were the targets
of the first countervailing duty law in the United States, which
77
was enacted in 1890.
Articles VI and XVI of GATT 1947 address the question of
subsidies and the remedies that governments could provide.
The wide prevalence of export subsidies on primary commodities and agricultural goods led to a split approach to export subsidies for much of the life of the GATT, and, most recently, the
WTO. Consider the language of Article XVI of GATT 1947, as
modified and incorporated as GATT 1994 (under the WTO,
there are no longer "Contracting Parties" but "Members"):
Section A - Subsidies in General
77. See UR TREATISE, supra note 1, at 812-13.
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1. If any contracting party grants or maintains any subsidy,
including any form of income or price support, which operates directly or indirectly to increase exports of any product from, or to reduce imports of any product into, its territory, it shall notify the contracting parties in writing of
the extent and nature of the subsidization, of the estimated effect of the subsidization on the quantity of the
affected product or products imported into or exported
from its territory and of the circumstances making the subsidization necessary. In any case in which it is determined
that serious prejudice to the interests of any other contracting party is caused or threatened by any such subsidization, the contracting party granting the subsidy shall,
upon request, discuss with the other contracting party or
parties, or with the contracting parties, the possibility of
limiting the subsidization.
Section B - Additional Provisions on Export Subsidies
2. The contracting parties recognize that the granting by a
contracting party of a subsidy on the export of any product
may have harmful effects for other contracting parties,
both importing and exporting, may cause undue disturbance to their normal commercial interests, and may hinder the achievement of the objectives of this Agreement.
3. Accordingly, contracting parties should seek to avoid the
use of subsidies on the export of primary products. If,
however, a contracting party grants directly or indirectly
any form of subsidy which operates to increase the export
of any primary product from its territory, such subsidy
shall not be applied in a manner which results in that contracting party having more than an equitable share of
world export trade in that product, account being taken of
the shares of the contracting parties in such trade in the
product during a previous representative period, and any
special factors which may have affected or may be affecting
such trade in the product.
4. Further, as from 1 January 1958 or the earliest practicable
date thereafter, contracting parties shall cease to grant either directly or indirectly any for of subsidy on the export
of any product other than a primary product which subsidy results in the sale of such product for export at a price
lower than the comparable price charged for the like
product to buyers in the domestic market. Until 31 December 1957 no contracting party shall extend the scope
of any such subsidization beyond that existing on 1 Janu-
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ary 1955 by the introduction of new, or the extension of
existing, subsidies.
5. The contracting parties shall review the operation of the
provisions of this Article from time to time with a view to
examining its effectiveness, in the light of actual experience, in promoting the objectives of this Agreement and
avoiding subsidization seriously 78prejudicial to the trade or
interests of contracting parties.
Article VI of the GATT 1947 and 1994 provides nations with
a domestic remedy similar to those of anti-dumping actions
when imported products benefit from subsidies through actions.
The practice investigated is the subsidization of the exported
product and material injury to a domestic industry.
Subsidy concerns have seesawed back and forth over the
years in terms of GATT's, and now the WTO's, focus. In the
1970s and 1980s, the United States aggressively pursued the subsidization practices of trading partners, but did not have a material injury standard for cases involving dutiable merchandise, a
practice "grandfathered" under the GATT prior to the Tokyo
Round agreements. This led many trading nations to seek
clearer rules on what was actionable in fact and to require the
United States to apply a material injury test in its domestic legislation. The Tokyo Round Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the Subsidies Code) recognized
"that subsidies are used by governments to promote important
objectives of national policy."7 9
Many major developed agricultural exporting nations used
significant financial resources to promote their agricultural
products in export markets. Similarly, the crisis in the steel industry resulted in massive, global infusions of money by state
treasuries to keep companies and facilities afloat or to expand
capacity. Again, major civil aircraft producing nations raised accusations of substantial subsidization of foreign producers as did
lumber industries concerned about national policies restricting
access to materials. These major subsidization issues led to the
Uruguay Rounds' adoption of limitations and initial reductions
78. GATT 1994 art. XVI.
79. Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Preamble, reprinted in GATT, 26th Supp.
BISD 56 (1980).
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on agricultural export subsidies and potentially trade-distorting
domestic subsidies.8 0 The creation of a new subsidy agreement
provided, for the first time, a definition of a subsidy and defined
categories of subsidies (i.e., prohibited, actionable, and non-actionable) ." It identified ways of addressing valuation issues, examples of serious prejudice and defenses to such a finding. s2 In
short, the Uruguay Round Agreements continued the process of
clarifying the type of government intervention that was likely to
be viewed as trade distortive. It expanded on the notion of prohibited subsidies, and provided fairly clear guidelines as to how
governments could take actions that would not be subject to international interference.
The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
(or "SCM Agreement") requires Members to provide "new and
full" notifications periodically and annual updates on the types
and levels of subsidies provided. These requirements, however,
did not enjoy a high rate of compliance. As reviewed in the Report (2000) of the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures:
6. 1998 new and full notifications. Pursuant to Article 25.1 of
the Agreement and Article XVI:I of GATT 1994, all Members of the Committee were required to submit a new and
full notification of subsidies to the Committee by 30 June
1998. As of 7 November 2000, only 28 WTO Members
(the EC is counted as one Member) had notified subsidies
pursuant to Article 25 of the Agreement and Article XVI of
GATT 1994. In addition, 18 Members had notified that
they maintain no subsidies notifiable pursuant to these
provisions. These notifications may be found in document
series G/SCM/N/38/.... Seventy-four Members had submitted no notification as of the close of the period covered
by this Report. A table indicating the status of 1998 notifications is reproduced in Annex A to this Report.8"
Some important trading nations, including Colombia, Hungary,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Peru, the Philippines, Romania,
80. See generally Agreement on Agriculture; Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IA, at http://www.wto.org/
english/docs.e/legal_e/final_e.html [hereinafter SCM Agreement].
81. SCM Agreement arts. 1, 3, 5, 8.
82. Id. at Annex IV, Annex V.
83. Report (2000) of the Committee on Subsidies and CountervailingMeasures, G/L/408
(Nov. 10, 2000).
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South Africa, and Venezuela, did not provide the 1998 "new and
full" subsidy notifications. The remaining non-notifiers are typically smaller players in international trade, including many of
the least developed countries.8 4
A "peace clause '8 5 found within the Agreement on Agriculture results in a relatively small number of cases on agricultural
subsidies actually brought to the WTO. There was, however, significant activity within the WTO dispute settlement body on subsidy practices, particularly export subsidies, in the first six years
of the WTO's existence. For example, there were panel reports
and, in many cases, Appellate Body rulings on nine cases, six of
which involved allegations of prohibited subsidies (as defined in
Article 3 of the SCM Agreement):
Subsidy Disputes at the WTO (1995-2000)
Dispute

Issue

Panel & AB
Reports

1 Brazil-Measures
Affecting Desiccated
Coconut, WT/DS22

Whether Brazil's imposition of
countervailing duties on Philippine
coconut fruit was consistent with
Article VI of GATT 1994.

WT/DS22/R (Oct.
17, 1996)
WT/DS22/AB/R
(Feb. 21, 1997)

2

Whether Indonesia extended the
scope of tariff and tax subsidies in a
manner inconsistent with Article 28 of
the SCM Agreement; whether subsidies
under the National Motor Vehicle
Programme have caused serious
prejudice or a threat thereof to the
interests of other Member states
according to Articles 6 and 27 of the
SCM Agreement.

WT/DS54R, WT/
DS55/R, WT/
DS59/R, WT/
DS64/R (July 2,
1998)

Indonesia-Certain
Measures Affecting
the Automobile
Industry, WT/DS54,
55, 59 & 64

84. Id. at 5. Although the 2000 Report indicated that Brazil had not submitted
notifications for 1998, in fact, Brazil did submit a "new and full" notification on November 21, 2000 (not published until January 2001) covering the period 1996-1999. See New
and Full and UpdatingNotificationsPursuant to Article XVI:I of the GAT 1994 and Article 25
of the SCM Agreement-Brazil, G/SCM/N/25/BRA, G/SCM/N/38/BRA, G/SCM/N/
48/BRA, G/SCM/N/60/BRA (Jan. 8, 2001).
85. See Agreement on Agriculture art. 13.
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3

Brazil-Export
Financing
Programmefor
Aircraft, WT/DS46

Whether Brazil's PROEX interest
equalization payments, in general, or
in respect to particular transactions
are export subsidies within the
meaning of Article 3 of the SCM
Agreement that are not covered by the
exception in item (k) of the
Illustrative List of Export Subsidies or
exempted by the developing country
exception in Article 27.2(b) of the

4

Canada-Measures
Affecting the Export
of Civilian Aircraft,
WT/DS70

Whether Canada's benefits provided to
corporations established to facilitate
the export of civil aircraft and/or to
the aircraft industry were export
subsidies within the meaning of Article
3 of the SCM Agreement.

WT/DS70/R (Apr.
14, 1999)
WT/DS/AB/R
(Aug. 2, 1999)

5

Australia-Subsidies
Provided to Producers
and Exporters of
Automotive Leather,
WT/DS126

Whether Australia's loan to or grant
payments to an Australian automotive
leather producer were export subsidies
within the meaning of Article 3 of the
SCM Agreement.

WT/DS126/R
(May 25, 1999)

6

Canada-Measures
Affecting the
Importation of Milk
and the Exportation
of Daiy Products,
WT/DS103, 113

Whether Canada's subsidies on dairy
products were consistent with Article 3
of the SCM Agreement.

WT/DS103/R,
WT/DS113/R
(May 17, 1999)
WT/DS103/AB/R,
WT/DS113/AB/R
(Oct. 13, 1999)

7

United States-Tax
Treatment for
"ForeignSales
Corporations,"WT/
DS108

Whether U.S. tax exemptions and
special administrative pricing rules for
foreign sales corporation were
subsidies within the meaning of Article
3.1(a) and 3.1(b) of the SCM
Agreement.

WT/DS108/R
(Oct. 8, 1999)
WT/DS108/AB/R
(Feb. 24, 2000)

8

United StatesImposition of
CountervailingDuties
on Certain HotRolled Lead and
Bismuth Carbon Steel
Products Originating
in the United
Kingdom, WT/
DS138

Whether U.S. imposition of
countervailing duties on certain hotrolled lead and bismuth carbon steel
products from the United Kingdom I
three administrative reviews was
consistent with Articles 1.1 (b), 10, 14,
19 of the SCM Agreement.

WT/DS138/R
(Dec. 23, 1999)
WT/DS138/AB/R
(May 10, 2000)

9

Canada-Certain
Measures Affecting
the Automotive
Industry, WT/
DS139, 142

Whether Canada's import duty
exemption on motor vehicles was
inconsistent with Articles 3.1(a), 3.1 (b)
and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement.

WT/DS139/R,
WT/DS142/R
(Feb. 11, 2000)
WT/DS139/AB/
R,WT/DS142/AB/
R (May 31, 2000)

WT/DS46/R (Apr.
14, 1999)
WT/DS46/AB/R
(Aug. 2, 1999)

SCM Agreement).

A number of the decisions are highly controversial in those
countries that lost the cases (e.g., Brazil aircraft, U.S. foreign
sales corporations, and U.S. on the countervailing duty case on
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lead bismuth where the question was whether the sale of a company for "market value" eliminates subsidies previously received). Nonetheless (and subject to the concerns reviewed in
the dispute settlement portion of this Essay), the attention being
paid to subsidy questions is not surprising considering their ability to distort trade flows.
Currently there are a host of other matters involving potential subsidy issues that are either under consultation or working
their way through the dispute settlement process.8

6

Conse-

quently, the area will remain highly charged and the subject of
86. See the following list:
List of Pending Cases Involving the SCM Agreement.
Dispute

DS No.

1.

Brazil-Countervailing Duties on Imports of Desiccated
Coconut and Coconut Milk Powder from Sri Lanka

WT/DS30

2.

Brazil-Certain Automotive Investment Measures

WT/DS51

3.

Brazil-Certain Measures Affecting Trade and Investment in
the Automotive Sector

WT/DS52

4.

Australia-Textile, Clothing and Footwear Import Credit
Scheme

WT/DS57

5.

Brazil-Certain Measures Affecting Trade and Investment in
the Automotive Sector

WT/DS65

6.

Canada-Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft

WT/DS71

7.

Brazil-Certain Measures Affecting Trade and Investment in
the Automotive Sector

WT/DS81

8.

United States-Countervailing Duty Investigation of Imports of
Salmon from Chile

WT/DS97

9.

European Communities-Measures Affecting the Exportation of
Processed Cheese

WT/DS104

10.

Peru-Countervailing Duty Investigation Against Imports of
Buses from Brazil

WT/DSl12

11.

Belgium-Certain Income Tax Measures Constituting Subsidies

WT/DS127

12.

Netherlands-Certain Income Tax Measures Constituting
Subsidies

WT/DS128

13.

Greece-Certain Income Tax Measures Constituting Subsidies

WT/DS129

14.

Ireland-Certain Income Tax Measures Constituting Subsidies

WT/DS130

15.

France-Certain Income Tax Measures Constituting Subsidies

WT/DS131

16.

Argentina-Countervailing Duties on Imports of Wheat Gluten
from the European Communities

WT/DS145

17.

Japan-Tariff Quotas and Subsidies Affecting Leather

WT/DS147
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frequent dispute. That being said, there is no reason (other
than an individual nation's desire to modify adverse rulings) to
reopen the Subsidy and Countervailing Measures Agreement at
this point. Many of the matters that have been litigated have
been outstanding issues of concern to Members for a number of
years.
Countervailing duty laws tend to be used much less frequently than anti-dumping laws due in part to the fact that historic active users (e.g., the United States) have adopted constructions of "actionability" which makes it possible in most cases for
other nations to modify their laws to avoid actionability under
the importing nation's law. It is also due to nations' desires not
to go after practices of trading partners that may be reflected in
their domestic policies as well. The result is far fewer users
(where the 2000 report of the Anti-dumping Committee reports
33 users, the 2000 report of the Subsidies Committee reports 11
users), far fewer initiations in any given year (e.g., twenty countervailing duty investigations in the period between July 1, 1999
andJune 30, 2000 versus 221 dumping investigation in the same
period), and far fewer measures in effect on June 30, 2000
18.

United States-Countervailing Duty Investigation with respect
to Live Cattle from Canada

WT/DS167

19.

EC-Measures Relating to the Development of a Flight
Management System

WT/DS172

20.

France-Measures Relating to the Development of a Flight
Management System

WT/DS173

21.

United States-Measures Treating Export Restraints as
Subsidies

WT/DS194

22.

United States-Measures Treating Export Restraints as
Subsidies

WT/DS194

23.

Philippines-Measures Affecting Trade and Investment in the
Motor Vehicle Sector

WTr]/DS195

24.

United States-Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures on
Steel Plate from India

WT/DS206

25.

United States-Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain
Products from the European Communities

WT/DS212

26.

United States-Countervailing Duties on Certain CorrosionResistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Germany

WT/DS213

For a full review of the first six years of the WTO's dispute settlement system with a
focus on disputes concerning trade remedies (i.e., anti-dumping duties, countervailing
duties, safeguards), see TERENCE P. STEWART & Amy S. DWYER, HANDBOOK ON WTO
TRADE REMEDY DISPUTES: THE FiRST Six YEARs (1995-2000), (forthcoming 2001).
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(ninety-five countervailing duty measures versus 1141 anti-dumping duty measures, with a number of countries not reporting
measures outstanding on dumping).87
Similarly, countervailing duty measures in effect are largely
limited to steel and certain agriculture products, as the following
table reviews:
Definitive CountervailingDuties in Force (As ofJune 30, 2000)
Argentina

3 agricultural products from the EU

Australia

5 agricultural products from member nations of the EU

Brazil

6 agricultural products (5 on powdered coconut and one on coconut
milk (Cote d'Ivoire, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Sri Lanka)

Canada

7 measures, of which 3 on agricultural products from the EU or its
Members, three on steel mill products (India, Indonesia, Thailand) and
one on memorials from India

EU

12 measures, of which 1 on agricultural products from Norway, 5 on
steel mill products (India, Taiwan), 3 on synthetic polyester fibres
(Australia, Indonesia and Taiwan) and three miscellaneous (India and
Taiwan)

Mexico

2 agricultural products from the EU or member nations of the EU

United States

46 measures, of which 31 on steel mill products (EU nations, Brazil,
Canada, India, Mexico, South Africa, Korea, Turkey), 6 on agricultural
products (EU, EU Members, Iran, Norway, Turkey), 9 miscellaneous
(Brazil, Canada, EU member nations, Pakistan, Venezuela, Korea,
Taiwan)

Venezuela

3 agricultural products from the EU

New Zealand

2 agricultural products from the EU or member states of the EU

Sources: G/SCM/N/62/ARG (Aug. 11, 2000); G/SCM/N/AUS (July 13, 2000); G/SCM/N/
62/BRA (Aug. 1, 2000); G/SCM/N/CAN (Aug. 29, 2000); G/SCM/N/62/CHL (Sept. 19,
2000); G/SCM/N/EEC (Nov. 9, 2000); G/SCM/N/62/MEX (Sept. 22, 2000); G/SCM/N/
NZL (Aug. 21, 2000); G/SCM/N/62/USA (Sept. 21, 2000); G/SCM/N/VEN (Oct. 30,
2000); G/SCM/N/62/ZAF (Sept. 25, 2000).

The focus of activities within the WTO in the near future
should be on the improvement of the notification process, including prioritizing work with significant trading nation Members who have not provided the 1998 "new and full" notification.
For many of the other nations who have not provided notifications, technical assistance may be required and should be made
available on an export trade volume basis or some other means
that will give as complete a picture as early as possible.
87. Compare Report (2000) of the Committee on Subsidies and CountervailingMeasures,
G/L/408 (Nov. 10, 2000), with Report (2000) of the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices,
G/L/404 at 15-18 (Nov. 8, 2000).
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III. RULES TO BE ADDED
A. PerishableAgriculture
The Uruguay Round negotiations were notable in part because they established some disciplines on agricultural subsidies,
an agreement to eliminate many non-tariff barriers, minimum
market access commitments and the first steps in tariff liberalization. From the beginning the difficulties with the treatment of
agricultural trade on a comprehensive basis were clear. Food security, the portion of the population in many countries still engaged in agriculture, the peculiarities of agriculture (price volatility, perishability, and seasonality), past experience with
drought, armed-conflict and resulting human suffering, tremendous disparity in the ability of national governments to subsidize
export and domestic production all led to extraordinarily difficult negotiations. Farmers took to the streets in many countries
to demonstrate their concerns, some Agricultural Ministers resigned based on liberalization ultimately agreed to, countries
which historically have benefited from liberalization in trade of
manufactured goods found themselves needing special breaks
for critical agricultural products-typically including dairy in the
West and rice in the East-with duties rising after tariffication of
then existing non-tariff measures in some countries to a breathtaking level, some as high as 600%! The Agreement on Agriculture that finally emerged recognized that the initial accomplishments were only the first step in agricultural trade liberalization.
Hence, Article 20 of the agreement calls for "Continuation of
the Reform Process:"
Recognizing that the long-term objective of substantial progressive reductions in support and protection resulting in
fundamental reform is an ongoing process, Members agree
that negotiations for continuing the process will be initiated
one year before the end of the implementation period, taking
into account:
(a) the experience to that date from implementing the
reduction commitments;
(b) the effects of the reduction commitments on world
trade in agriculture;
(c) non-trade concerns, special and differential treatment to developing country Members, and the objective to establish a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system, and the other objectives and

700

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 24:652

concerns mentioned in the preamble to this Agreement; and
(d) what further commitments are necessary to88achieve
the above mentioned long-term objectives.
Thus, agriculture is one of the major areas where there has been
a built-in agenda for further liberalization.
To date, the second phase of liberalization negotiations,
which started in 2000, focuses on both the breadth and speed of
future liberalization and the extent to which non-trade concerns
should be addressed. Little attention is spent, however, on the
question of whether existing rules should be modified or expanded in order to address the special nature of agricultural
trade, including places where perishability and seasonality of
production are major issues.
Agricultural producers at the farm level continue to be
characterized, by and large, as highly fragmented in most economies, suggesting that farmers typically have limited negotiating
clout in selling their product. Unlike manufactured goods,
these producers typically have limited control over the volume of
product produced other than the decision on how much acreage to plant and what type of product to grow. Weather can
have an overwhelming effect on actual production in any given
year-drought and major storms can greatly diminish production volumes while good weather can result in bumper crops.
Moreover, for many agricultural products, the farmer has
limited ability to hold the product in inventory in an effort to
even out offerings in the market and to prevent price collapses.
Fruits and vegetables are good examples of farm products that
must be sold within a very short window of time or they perish
and become unmarketable. Similarly, cattle have a relatively
short window of time in which to be sold before the returns on
the product drop sharply due to the additional cost of feed, or
conversely reduction in weight gain and the consequent diminished returns from the purchasers. Thus, large parts of agriculture in many countries can be characterized as subject to tremendous volatility in prices, often regardless of the actions of
the producers.
The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission describes the condition of price volatility that characterizes agricul88. Agreement on Agriculture art. 20.
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tural markets, especially for seasonal and perishable products, as
follows:
Agricultural prices are structurally prone to fluctuations because of the short-run inelasticities of supply and demand for
agricultural products. Production of an agricultural commodity, for the most part, is fixed in the short run and is
highly dependent on growing conditions, which can vary
greatly from one year to the next. This can create periods of
under or over supply. Similarly, the demand for basic commodities tends to be stable and generally is more responsive
to changes in income and taste than to changes in price. In
this situation, a small shift in supply or demand conditions
can have a major impact on market prices. As a result of
these price swings, farm incomes can be highly variable from
one year to the next.
In addition, the supply of agricultural commodities within
any one crop year or production cycle is seasonal in nature.
Crops are abundant at harvest, and supplies fall during the remainder of the market year. Animal production, though more
continuous, is also predisposed to production cycles due to
animal birth rates and feeding schedules. Demand for most raw
agricultural commodities, however, is steady throughout the
year. This contrast can give rise to seasonal cycles of low prices
peaks, followed by higher prices as
at harvest or production
89
stocks are drawn down.
A specific example of price volatility is demonstrated in the
following table. It shows prices received by U.S. farmers for tomatoes for fresh market, monthly for 1996. The data presented
demonstrate the volatility in prices, which is typical of all perishable agricultural products. The price volatility shown would be
even greater if prices were examined on a daily basis.

89. U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Division of Economic Analysis,
Policy Alternatives Relating to Agicultural Trade Options and Other Agricultural Risk-Shifting
Contracts, (May 13, 1997), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ag/ag8.htm.
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Prices Received - Monthly 1996 Tomatoes for Fresh Market
Dollars per cwt
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December

18.4
40.0
81.7
50.5
24.4
24.2
26.0
22.1
23.4
28.3
29.7
30.4

Source: "Agricultural Prices 1997 Summary"
USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service
(July 1998).

Over time, individual governments have had various ways of
reacting to the swings in profitability that affect farmers and
ranchers, including such measures as (a) large economic transfers (though often in the form of loans), (b) establishment of
minimum prices, (c) enactment of laws to permit producers to
control production volumes to some extent through grade and
other measures, and (d) laws to waive antitrust concerns when
farmers band together in cooperatives or other forms to market
their product collectively.9' Presently, there are no multilateral
90. The United States provides special rules that partially protect certain fruit and,
vegetable growers from wide price fluctuations in the market. The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act ("AMAA") of 1937, 7 U.S.C. § 601 et seq., authorizes the Secretary
of Agriculture to establish marketing orders and agreements. While marketing agreements and marketing orders are similar, the Secretary of Agriculture is an actual party
to marketing agreements, which he or she enters into with processors and producers of
agricultural commodities. See id. at 7 U.S.C. § 608b(a). Marketing orders are more
common than marketing agreements; they are issued by the Secretary of Agriculture
and apply to "processors, associations of producers, and others engaged in the handling
of any agricultural commodity." Id. at 7 U.S.C. § 608c(1).
According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, marketing orders and marketing
agreements are intended "to help stabilize market conditions for fruit and vegetable
products." See Agricultural Marketing Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, What are
Marketing Orders and How Do They Operate?, at http://www.ams.usda.gov/fv/
moview.html. These programs let farmers act collectively to address problems they face
in the market. Id. At present, some 36 active marketing agreements and marketing
orders exist. Id.
The AMAA, at § 608c(6), provides several regulatory controls that, by setting certain conditions for the sale of fruits and vegetables, promote price stability. These

20001

OPPORTUNITIES.IN THE WTO

rules addressing these same concerns, nor even plurilateral rules
in most regional agreements such as NAFTA.
At the same time, many farmers are subject to seasonality
limitations that make the traditional notion of a domestic industry or regional industry under existing multilateral rules, at least,
questionable. For example, in a large country like the United
States, production of fresh vegetables during the winter months
is concentrated in Florida. Producers in that part of the United
States do not compete with producers of the same product during the summer or fall where production occurs in other parts of
the United States. The same is true in Mexico where the Sinaloa
region produces in much the same time period as Florida, while
Baja has production in a different time frame. For these products, regional considerations under the anti-dumping agreement
are not applicable because the products can be, and are,
shipped long distances. Yet, because of perishability, the health
of regional producers may very well depend on imports from a

mechanisms of marketing orders and marketing agreements include limiting or allotting the quantity of an agricultural commodity that can be marketed; limiting the size,
grade, or quality of products that can be sold; and providing for the control and disposition of surpluses and the creation of reserve pools. See 7 U.S.C. §608c(6) (A)-(E). Imported fruits and vegetables are required to meet the same grade, size, quality, or maturity standards as domestically produced commodities covered by marketing orders.
See id. at § 608e-1.
The AMAA does not explicitly permit the establishment of minimum prices for
fruits and vegetables. However, recognizing that the AMAA "was devised as a means for
combating chronic fluctuation of prices due to overproduction of certain commodities," courts have permitted the setting of minimum prices under marketing orders
when disposing of reserve commodities. Prune Bargaining Ass'n v. Butz, 444 F. Supp.
785, 793 (N.D. Cal. 1975), affid, 571 F.2d 1132 (9th Cir. 1978); see also Cal-Almond,
Inc., v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 14 F.3d 429 (9th Cir. 1993). Importantly, the AMAA grants
an antitrust exemption for activities conducted under a marketing agreement. See 7
U.S.C. § 608b. While § 608b mentions only marketing agreements, and not marketing
orders, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the antitrust exemption applies to both.
See United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 201-02 (1939). Federal appeals courts
have assumed the same. See Chiglades Farm, Ltd. v. Butz, 485 F.2d 1125, 1134-35 (5th
Cir. 1973); Wileman Bros. & Elliot v. Giannini, 909 F.2d 332, 334-35 n.4 (9th Cir. 1990).
The Capper-Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-92, like the AMAA, provides a mechanism for fruit and vegetable growers to stabilize prices in the market. Similar to the
AMAA, the Capper-Volstead Act provides a limited exception for agricultural cooperatives from antitrust laws. In Northern CaliforniaSupermarkets, Inc. v. Central CaliforniaLettuce ProducersCocperative, 413 F. Supp. 984 (N.D. Cal. 1976), aff'd, 580 F.2d 369 (9th Cir.
1978), the Court held that a cooperative's policy of fixing vegetable prices was protected by the antitrust exemption of the Act. The Capper-Volstead Act does not mention the treatment of imported commodities.
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particular region of a foreign country during the period when
production is occurring.
Moreover, with price volatility and short production periods
available to farmers, there is a compelling need for rules that
permit a correction of a market problem quickly. Safeguard actions under the Agreement on Safeguards are not timely for the
needs of many sectors within agriculture. While Article 5 of the
Agreement on Agriculture provides for special safeguard provisions for a small subset of agricultural products, and paragraph 6
recognizes perishable and seasonal considerations, Article 5 is
not available on all products from all countries or to a uniform
subset of products whose characteristics would make Article 5 a
potentially appropriate rule.9
There is also some effort to address the special needs of perishable goods within the WTO's Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes ("DSU"). At
the consultations stage, in cases of urgency (which include those
concerning perishable goods), Members are required to enter
into consultations within ten days of the receipt of the request.
If the consultations fail to settle the dispute within twenty days of
the receipt of the request, the complaining party may request
the establishment of a panel.9 2 Additionally, in urgent cases, including those concerning perishable goods, the parties to the
dispute, the panel, and the Appellate Body should make every
effort to accelerate the resolution of the dispute.9 3 Under the
panel's procedures, in urgent cases (which include those involving perishable goods), panels are urged to expedite their procedures and issue their report to the parties within three months
instead of the usual of six months.9 4 Although the Appellate
Body is urged to accelerate the resolution of the dispute, no
timeframe is suggested for issuing their report in cases of urgency (which include perishable products). While these provisions are potentially helpful, countries have been frustrated in
their use, and the timeline of even expedited DSU proceedings
offers little actual help to producers facing a problem today.
The above comments reflect an existing opportunity for the
91.
92.
93.
94.

See Agreement on Safeguards art. 5.
See DSU art. 4.
See id.
See id.
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trading system to improve support within agriculture for expanded liberalization-the opportunity to review the need for
and negotiate rules within the Agreement on Agriculture, which
will address the special needs of agricultural producers because
of perishability and seasonality. Without such special rules,
trade liberalization will tend to exacerbate divisions within nations on the need for and wisdom of expanding trade opportunities in agricultural products. In the United States, for example,
as part of NAFTA, U.S. vegetable producers were promised tools
to address surges in imports. The mechanism provided has
proven unusable for domestic producers, undermining these
producers' support for further liberalization within the WTO or
within the hemisphere.
Interestingly, there has been significant interest in addressing some or all of these issues by various governmental and private sector groups, although no nation has yet put the issues
onto the negotiating table in Geneva. A review of some of the
views within the United States, Mexico, and Canada follows.
1. U.S. Proposals For Treatment of Perishable Products
Since the Uruguay Round, various organizations have recommended the development of special trade rules for perishable and seasonal products. In the past three years, the American
Farm Bureau Federation has testified several times before Congress. On at least three of these occasions, the American Farm
Bureau has repeated its recommendation to modify DSU provisions involving perishable products.9 5 The American Farm Bureau has suggested that the dispute settlement process for perishable agricultural products should be modified so as to allow
the procedure to be used where only the aggrieved party proposes its use. Under the current system, the WTO requires both
parties to a dispute to agree to use the perishable-products pro95. See United State Negotiating Objectivesfor the WJ'O Seattle MinisterialMeeting Before
the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Dean Kieckner, President, American Farm Bureau Federation); see also The
Administration's Preparationsfor the 1999 World Trade Organization Ministerial: Before the
House Comm. on Agric., 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Al Christopherson, President,
Minnesota Farm Bureau, on behalf of American Farm Bureau Federation); Implementation of Fast Track Authority: Before the Sucomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Bob Rice, President, California Farm Bureau
on behalf of American Farm Bureau Federation).
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cedure.9 6 The American Farm Bureau believes that promptly enacting this change would address the fundamental problem of a
dispute settlement process that requires too much time and prevents market access for several marketing seasons before a resolution is reached.9 7 For its part, the Seattle Round Agricultural
Committee9 8 articulated a similar concern when it recommended that negotiators accelerate resolution of agricultural
trade disputes. 9 Although it did not provide the negotiators
with specifics, one source did point out that the requirement
that both sides must agree to use an expedited schedule should
be reworked to mandate an expedited schedule.' 0 0
Various state government officials also have testified before
Congress on the need for special rules for perishable agriculture. The State of Florida, for instance, has urged that the
United States support reform of the Agriculture Agreement to
address effectively the problem of price volatility in perishable
agricultural commodities.
Issues important to seasonal and perishable or specialty agriculture were not fully addressed during the last round of multilateral trade negotiations. We have requested that these issues be addressed on the agenda in the upcoming Ministerial
Round. We must have some mechanism to address price collapses in perishable commodities. We desire specific rules to
deal with seasonal and perishable agricultural products, as

well as enforcement of scientifically based sanitary and
phytosanitary issues, workable and timely safeguard mechanisms, rapid dispute settlement resolutions, open market access, and elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade.
96. See United State Negotiating Objectives for the WrO Seattle MinisterialMeeting. Before
the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Dean Kleckner, President, American Farm Bureau Federation).
97. See id.
98. The Seattle Round Agricultural Committee ("SRAC") is a coalition of more
than seventy U.S.-based commodity groups and associations representing agricultural
producers, processors and agribusinesses. Its goal is to demonstrate U.S. agricultural
and food sector support for the launching of a comprehensive round of multilateral
trade negotiations and the need for free and fair trade in agricultural commodities and
products. See Agriculture Coalition Sets Prioritiesfor WTO, Sidesteps Radical Reform, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, May 21, 1999 [hereinafter Agricultural Coalition].
99. See id. The National Association of State Departments of Agriculture (or
"NASDA") has also endorsed a change in international trade rules for perishable goods.
See Policy Statement, NASDA, International Marketing and Trade of Agricultural Products (Sept. 26, 2000).
100. See Agriculture Coalition, supra note 96.
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We, along with other states with similar interests, pledge to
work with USTR, USDA and our Congressional Delegation to
affect policy matters both in the international WTO Ministerial negotiations and to forge needed changes in domestic
law to gain a conducive situation to trade in out agricultural
products.
No specific rules exist to deal with general trade or dispute
resolution involving perishable and seasonal commodities.
The former head of the Uruguay Round agriculture negotiating team when asked, at the AG Forum immediately preceding the FTAA Business Forum in Belo Horizonte, if specific
rules for perishable commodities were needed, agreed that
specific rules could be helpful and may be advisable. Florida
has sought recognition that trade remedies should be available on perishable and seasonal agricultural products that reflect the commercial realities of these products. The Agreement on Agriculture already recognizes the need for separate
treatment or timelines. We request that the U.S. consider adding discussion of the need for rules for perishable and seasonal commodities as an item on the agenda for the upcoming ministerial in Seattle. Similarly, the U.S. should include
in the negotiations consideration of what, if any, special rules
may be needed to cope with commodity price collapses such
0
as have been experienced in livestock and grain." '
101. United State Negotiating Objectives for the WJ'O Seattle MinisterialMeeting . Before
the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Bob Crawford, Commissioner of Agriculture).
In addition, in comments submitted to the Trade Policy Staff Committee, Florida
suggested specific reforms that would help to address the needs of perishable and seasonal agricultural products:
Florida's agricultural industry has been deeply disappointed in the inability of
existing U.S. trade laws and international agreements to address the needs of
perishable and seasonal products. While Article 5 of the Agriculture Agreement recognizes both perishable and seasonal products in the context of the
Special Safeguards Provisions, there is nothing in the Agriculture Agreement
which otherwise defines the issues or identifies rights and obligations with regard to these products. One such right should be that for purposes of rules
based actions (anti-dumping, countervailing duty, safeguard), a seasonal product can be a separate industry to the extent that relief is provided for only that
season. This change could arguably be accomplished within the Agriculture
Agreement or could be included in each of the other Agreements in the industry definition section. Similarly, the nature of perishable agricultural products is such that price volatility is extreme and consumers are not benefited by
the gyrations in price and volume from the farms. Consideration of approaches that can permit producers across borders to better stabilize supply
and maintain sustainable pricing should be pursued. One such approach
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Similarly, on behalf of the State of Arizona, the Director of
the Arizona Department of Agriculture has testified that the current avenues for dispute resolution in the WTO inadequately
suit the needs of producers of perishable and seasonable commodities because the very nature of such commodities requires
trade mechanisms that provide timely solutions. 10 2 He noted
that special rules are necessary to ensure that perishable shipments are not lost due to bureaucratic or political mechanisms. 10 3 The Arizona Department of Agriculture also suggested
that in the new round of negotiations, the United States should
seek clarification of the dispute settlement process with the goal
of a strong enforcement mechanism, limited settlement appeals,
and strict compliance deadlines.'0 4
Representative Karen Thurman (D-Fla.) also, in testimony
before the Subcommittee on Trade, has spoken of the many
unique considerations that perishable agricultural products face,
pointing out that products such as tomatoes, oranges, and peppers cannot be stored until markets change or trade disputes get
resolved. 10 5 Representative Thurman concluded that international trading rules need to be developed to address the special
of seasonal and perishable agricultural
concerns of producers
10 6
commodities.
2. International Proposals for Perishable Products
U.S. agricultural organizations and committees are not the
only parties for whom changes to the WTO rules for perishable
products would be beneficial; indeed, such reforms would benefit all WTO Members. 10 7 One specific example of international
could be a clarification that Art. 11.1 (b) note 4 of the Safeguard Agreement
does not apply in the case of agricultural agreements between countries.
Submission of Bob Crawford, Commissioner of Agriculture, State of Florida, Comments
of the FloridaDepartment of Agriculture and Consumer Services (FDACS) Regarding U.S. Preparationsfor the World Trade Organization'sMinisterialMeeting, at 8 (Oct. 16, 1998).
102. See United State Negotiating Objectives for the WfO Seattle Ministerial Meeting.
Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong.
(1999) (statement of Sheldon R. Jones, Director, Arizona Department of Agriculture).
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See US. Efforts to Reduce Barriersto Trade in Agriculture: Before the Subcomm. on
Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Rep.
Karen Thurman).
106. See id.
107. For example, Sheldon Jones, the Director of the Arizona Department of Agri-
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cooperation in addressing the problem of perishable agricultural products is seen in the meeting, in 1999, of representatives
from State Agricultural Commissions of the United States, Canada, and Mexico to develop common positions for future WTO
negotiations. That meeting produced the 1999 State-Provinces
Agricultural Accord. °8 These countries agreed that agriculture
should be given the highest priority for the new round of negotiations because failure to resolve difficult agricultural issues
would be detrimental to future growth and prosperity in the
United States, Canada, and Mexico." ° ' In addition, the representatives provided recommendations for a common negotiating
strategy, including a statement urging the creation of specific
rules and processes for trade in perishable and seasonable products that address the unique nature of these products.1 10
3. Conclusion
As part of the Agreement on Agriculture, Members agreed
to initiate negotiations for continuing the agricultural trade reform process one year before the end of the implementation period (i.e., by the end of 1999)."' Those negotiations have now
begun and, to date, a great deal of work has been undertaken to
identify potential issues affecting, approaches to, and concerns
with, further trade liberalization in agriculture.
If trade expansion in agriculture is to continue, it is critical
culture, in testimony before the Trade Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means
Committee, noted:
Presently, no specific rules exist to deal with the trade of perishable and seasonal commodities. When asked if specific rules for perishable commodities
were needed at the Ag Forum immediately preceding the Free Trade Area of
the Americas Business Forum in Belo Horizonte, the head of the Uruguay
Round agriculture negotiating team agreed that the promulgation of such
rules would be both helpful and advisable for all WTO member countries.
United State NegotiatingObjectives for the WTO Seattle MinisterialMeeting. Before the Subcomm.
on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Sheldon R. Jones, Director, Arizona Department of Agriculture) (emphasis added).
108. See Letter from Cary Peterson, President, National Association of State Departments of Agriculture, Jaime Rodriguez Lopez, Mexican Association of State Departments of Agriculture Development, and Eric Upsall, Chair, Provincial Ministers of Canada (July 17, 1999) (on file with authors).
109. See id.
110. See id. These issues can be addressed within NAFTA or other regional arrangements in part through expanding marketing orders and Capper-Volstead rights to
international producers and having similar legislation in the other NAFTA countries.
111. See Agreement on Agriculture art. 20.
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that the trading system come to grips with the peculiarities of the
sector and adopt rules that will permit the peculiarities to be
addressed in a mutually-agreed manner. The ongoing negotiations on agriculture are an important opportunity. Member nations should be sure the opportunity is not lost.
B. StructuralExcess Capacity
The multilateral trading system's rules typically address
problems of one country or, at least, one product at a time.
Thus, anti-dumping and countervailing duty actions are brought
against imports of a particular product from a particular country. Safeguard actions are brought against particular products
imported from all trading partners. Violations of market access
rights are brought against specific products. In most circumstances, the existing WTO rules (other than in the agricultural
area) work reasonably well and are typically used infrequently.
There are, however, situations where the international trading system is confronted by an international problem that is affecting many Member nations simultaneously. Extraordinary
events like the collapse of the former Soviet Union resulted in a
massive global imbalance between supply and demand in a number of sectors, an imbalance which has not corrected itself in
some sectors despite the nearly ten years, that have passed since
the original collapse in demand. Because the former Soviet
Union controlled a large share of international production resources in various'ifidu)stries and because demand declined
precipitously for manyl of 'the'se products within the successor
states, there have been worldwide dislocations that have led to a
wide variety of efforts at the local level to address the fallout in
national markets.
In some industries, such as steel, the structural problems
that developed as a result of the Soviet Union's collapse compounded structural excess capacity that had existed for long periods because of national security, job maintenance and other
reasons, and which was largely maintained by massive government subsidies. In recent years, these structural problems were
similarly exacerbated by the unusual financial crisis in certain
parts of Asia, which seriously decreased demand in important
markets of the world.
In one sector, aluminum, there was an ad hoc plurilateral
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effort to address the glut of aluminum production in light of
drastically-contracted demand following certain individual nation efforts to address the staggering overproduction. In the EC,
quotas were imposed on imports from Russia in 1993.112 The
United States sought comments on how to address the situation
(amidst indications that the domestic industry was likely to file
an anti-dumping case). 1 Finally, six countries reportedly entered a Memorandum of Understanding, which attempted to address the problem on a global basis with reported production
cut backs and other actions.1 14 The ad hoc solution was successful in restoring a better balance between supply and demand but
raised a variety of concerns under national antitrust laws in, at
least, some countries.
The ongoing crisis in the steel sector is a good example of
why the WTO should consider adding rules that would permit
structural excess capacity to be taken out of the system quickly
and according to internationally-agreed rules. The existing
tools, which are micro-economic in application, do not address
the underlying problem of massive excess capacity in an efficient
manner. Producers and consumers alike would be served by
providing multilateral solutions to these extraordinary problems.
1. Steel Industry as a Case Study
Many countries believe that a strong domestic steel industry
is essential because of its use in a variety of industries. Steel is a
major component in automobiles, building construction, major
appliances, national defense and other sectors. Historically,
countries have wanted to have a steel industry, both for employment reasons and as a resource in time of armed conflict. Thus,
it has been common for many nations too small to economically
justify the maintenance of steel facilities to nonetheless have
steel capacity. Moreover, the large integrated steel mills of the
past have been major employers, often in fairly isolated areas of
nations with few alternative employment opportunities. In times
of economic downturn for the sector, the contraction in de112. See Commission Regulation No. 227/93, O.J.L 198/21 (1993).
113. See Request for Public Comment on Strategies To Address Increased Exports
of Primary Aluminum From Newly Independent States, 58 Fed. Reg. 50,061 (Sept. 24,
1993).
114. See Don't Call it a Cartel,But World Aluminum Has Forged New Order, WALL ST. J.,

June 9, 1994, at 1.
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mand has proven economically unaffordable for the steel mills
of countries, either from an employment or profitability basis.
This has resulted, over time, in periodic waves of export surges at
depressed prices. It has also resulted in many nations being unwilling to let capacity be eliminated for one or more of the reasons reviewed previously. Hence, many nations have funneled
billions of dollars into their steel mills to prevent their collapse.
Add to this the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the successor states' need for hard currency, the financial crisis in Asia
(and elsewhere) amongst countries with significant steel production capacity, and the last few years have seen an unprecedented
array of trade cases brought against imported steel from other
countries.
a. Structural Imbalances in the Steel Industry: 1970s and 1980s
Serious excess capacity has existed in the global steel industry for some thirty years or more, certainly since the first oil crisis
The decline of the
in 1974 when demand decreased sharply.'
steel industry continued throughout the 1970s and early 1980s.
A combination of factors was responsible for this decline, including a severe economic recession in the 1980s, fundamental
changes in steel consumption patterns due to technological ad16
vances, intra-industry competition, and an increase in imports.'
Many governments, viewing the decrease in demand as a trough
continued production and
in the cyclical nature of the industry,
1 17
operations.
their
often expanded
Moreover, governments in developing countries added to
this excess capacity by investing in new government-sponsored
steel producers. 1 8 This capacity expansion resulted in a tripling
of capacity levels in developing countries between 1970 and
115. See Thomas R. Howell, Brent L. Bartlett, TI-E NEW CRISIS IN STEEL, Statement

Before the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Trade, Washington, D.C., at 7
(Feb. 25, 1999).
116. See UR TREATISE, supra note 1, at 822; see also Thomas R. Howell, Brent L.
Bartlett, THE NEW CRISIS IN STEEL, supra note 113, at 7-8. With demand still flat, the

combination of new mills and expansion of the old mills caused excess production
capacity to reach 120 million tons by the early 1980s. Id.
117. For example, during this time, Europe doubled its output, and, between 1960
and 1975, Japan experienced a sevenfold increase in capacity. See UR TREATISE, supra
note 1, at 822.
118. See THOMAS R. HOWELL, ET AL. STEEL AND THE STATE: GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION AND STEEL'S STRUCTURAL CRISIS 252-54 (1998).
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1986, at which point steelmaking capacity in developing countries reached 122 million metric tons." 9 During this period,
many governments intervened in their steel industry to prevent a
decrease in employment or production despite stagnant or declining demand in certain markets, exacerbating the imbalance
between global demand and supply.
b. Collapse of Demand in the Former Soviet Union
During the 1980s, the Soviet Union had one of the largest
minerals and metals sectors in the world. 12 0 The metals and
minerals sector accounted for about 25% of exports and employed more than 1.5 million people. 121 With the sudden
breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, the multilateral trading
system experienced a tremendous change in the supply and demand equation for these minerals and metals. This change in
supply and demand resulted in Russian producers exporting a
variety of metals and minerals at distressed prices as the collapse
in demand within the successor states and the need for hard currency led to contracts being set at virtually any price, typically far
below other exporting nations.
What was true for the metals and minerals sector generally
was especially true for steel. During the 1980s, the Soviet Union
was one the world's largest steel producers, with its military absorbing a large percentage of production. So heavy was the internal demand for steel within the Soviet Union that the country
was a net importer prior to 1991. After the dissolution of the
Soviet Union, Russia inherited most of its steel facilities. As was
true in some other nations as well, steelmaking facilities had
served as major employers of people. The location of facilities
often made the region heavily dependent for employment upon
the continuation of activity at the steelmaking facility. This situation made it difficult for the Russian Federation to permit the
type of layoffs and plant closures that might have been expected
based on technology and efficiency levels of many of the facili119. See id at 252.
120. See U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMM'N, Pub. No. 3153, Impediments to Competitiveness in Russia's Minerals and Metals Sector, in INDUSTRY TRADE AND TECHNOLOGY RE-

VIEW, at 1 (1998). These minerals and metals included iron ore, steel, bauxite (aluminum ore), aluminum, copper ore, zinc, nickel, and gold. See id.
121. See id.
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although there has been some privatization and some
downsizing of the steel industry.1 23 Not only was there a staggering drop in demand from the Russian military following the collapse of the Soviet Union but demand was collapsing throughout
the former Soviet Union, as were commercial links. 12 4 Despite
heavy staffing of facilities and drastic reductions in demand, the
substantial layoffs
Russian government was apprehensive about 125
for fear of creating a "huge social explosion.
As reported in the press, many Russian facilities were unable
to pay workers for months or paid them in kind. Russian facilities found collecting payments in the internal market to be difficult and instead focused on exporting to obtain hard currency
or improve the likelihood of being paid at all. Without well-established outlets in the West for their products, Russian producers often sold through sales agents focused on moving product
at any price. The result was that Russia exported record
amounts of steel. 1 26 Whereas the Soviet Union was a net importer of steel, Russia was exporting 65% of its output by mid1998.127

c. The Current Situation
The U.S. government recently described the excess capacity
situation in the global steel industry as follows:
Overcapacity is a relative term, and there is no single agreedupon definition. Generally, the term is used to describe the
fact that global steelmaking capacity has been consistently
well-above global steel production over the long term. In the
case of steel, this may be attributable to the fact that less than
perfect market forces dominate the industry, such that government supports and other activities have sustained uneco122. See id.
123. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION,
Report to the President: Global Steel Trade, Structural Problems and Future Solutions 37 (July

2000).
124. See U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMM'N, supra note 118.
125. See Thomas R. Howell, Brent L. Bartlett, THE NEW CRISIS IN STEEL, supra note
113 at 21.
126. See U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Report to the President: Global Steel Trade, StructuralProblems and Future Solutions at 40 (July

2000).
127. See Thomas R. Howell, Brent L. Bartlett, THE NEW CRISIS IN STEEL, supra note
113, at 23. Moreover, some Russian steel mills were actually exporting almost 100% of
their production, at prices well below those prevailing in foreign markets. See id.
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nomic capacity and production. Although there may be different ways to measure global steelmaking capacity and production, most industry experts that have analyzed the issue
find a sizeable and consistent gap between capacity and production over the long term.
A 1999 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) report concludes that world steelmaking capacity has remained well-above production between 1985 and
1999. The report states that world steelmaking capacity increased by almost 150 million metric tons (MT) during this
time and that by 2001 it will have increased by an additional
45 million MT. However, steel production has increased in
"distinctly smaller proportions," resulting in a widening gap
between production and capacity. (Efforts are currently
under way in the OECD Steel Committee to refine the capacity measurement pursuant to questions raised as to the accuracy of some of the underlying country capacity data.)
Most other steel analysts have also concluded that there is significant overcapacity in the global steel industry. A World
Steel Dynamics study of capacity utilization rates reached conclusions very similar to those of the OECD. Moreover, the
London-based Iron and Steel Statistics Bureau (ISSB) estimated world excess capacity to be 250 and 275 million MT in
1997 and 1998, respectively.
Comparable findings of overcapacity have been made for specific regions and countries. The ISSB calculated 100 million
MT of overcapacity in Eastern Europe and countries of the
former Soviet Union, 70 million MT in Asia, 50 million MT in
the European Union (mainly in Italy and Spain), and 15 million MT in the United States. The United Nations estimated
that overcapacity in Russia and the Ukraine was between 20
and 30 million MT. Analyzing the Japanese steel industry, a
1999 report by a committee sponsored by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, which took into account domestic and global demand over the long term, estimated that
fifteen percent of Japanese steelmaking capacity, about 17
million MT, was "surplus." Finally, one of the conclusions
reached by a recent International Monetary Fund report was
that "excess production capacity" had been created in the Korean steel industry as a result of government influenced private investment (although the report did not explain how this
conclusion was reached). While estimates from various
sources indicate that there is substantial unused steelmaking
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capacity throughout the world as a whole across many years,
high fixed costs and other factors (including, for example,
protected markets and subsidies) encourage steel makers to
operate facilities at high levels of capacity. Such high capacity
capacity overutilization, combined with substantial unused
1 28
hand, tends to suppress prices world wide.
d. Response of the United States to the Problem of
Excess Capacity
With the global excess capacity resulting in wave after wave
of distress pricing of imported product into the U.S. marketplace, U.S. producers lost the ability to supply the U.S. market.
Indeed, the United States became the only major producing nation with a substantial trade deficit on steel mill products. As a
very open and large market, the United States is frequently the
destination of choice -for excess capacity in other countries.
Problems in the early 1970s and a wave of anti-dumping
cases led to the creation of the Trigger Price Mechanism (or
"TPM"). The TPM was designed to let the U.S. government selfinitiate cases where prices of imports were below the full costs of
the most efficient producers at the time (the Japanese steel companies) .129 In exchange, trade cases were withdrawn or were not
filed by domestic steel producers. The TPM was revised once
but ultimately collapsed130in the face of the major global contraction in the early 1980s.
The U.S. producers filed a large
1982 and selected cases thereafter and
case in 1984 on all carbon and alloy
European Union, one of the major

number of steel cases in
pursued an escape clause
steel mill products. The
targets of the U.S. anti-

128. See U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, supra
note 124, at 3.
129. See, e.g., U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, Pub. No. 1021, Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, in 30TH REPORT-1978, at 11 (1979). "In late 1977 the Department of the
Treasury announced that it would inaugurate a trigger-price mechanism (TPM) for use
in monitoring the prices of imports of steel mill products .... The TPM was designed
to enable the U.S. Customs Service to initiate anti-dumping investigations on a "fasttrack" basis without waiting for receipt of complaints. The purpose is to alert Customs
to the possibility of sales at less than fair value." Id.
130. "On January 11, 1982, in response to seven domestic steel producers' filing
anti-dumping and/or countervailing duty petitions covering many steel mill products
from nine countries, Commerce suspended the TPM." U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, Pub.
No. 1414, Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, in 34TH REPORT-1982, at 240
(1983).
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dumping and countervailing duty actions in 1982, preferred voluntary restraints to prevent serious internal dislocations than
having the trade cases run their course. Similarly, although
large segments of the US steel industry obtained affirmative determinations by the U.S. International Trade Commission under
the 1984 safeguard investigation, the President, with support
from Congress, preferred voluntary restraint agreements (or
"VRA") on a broader array of products with many of the major
producers. These VRAs remained in place until 1992, at which
point a large round of new steel cases were filed.
The continuance of the steel crisis of 1998 resulted in an
ever-expanding number of cases, efforts to pass legislation to impose global quotas, a call for a global safeguard action, and a
spate of bankruptcies in the United States. In 2000, the U.S. government, through the U.S. Department of Commerce, conducted a study that resulted in the July 2000 report to the President. The Clinton Administration subsequently announced a
program of affirmative steps.13 ' The steps taken to date, however, have yet to resolve the U.S. producers' problems, resulting
to deal with increasin calls in early 2001 for emergency actions
132
problems.
other
and
ing bankruptcies
e. Response of the European Community
Following the crisis in 1974,' the European Community established a variety of measures to assist its steel industry. At the
beginning of the crisis in 1975, the Member States of the European Community intervened in the steel industry and provided
subsidies to failing producers to prevent a collapse of their steel
industries. 13 In the next few years they began to establish more
comprehensive programs. Between 1978 and 1988, the European Community set up import control measures through negotiation of bilateral agreements with more than twenty countries.' 3 4 These agreements gave the European Community some
131. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Commerce News (July 26, 2000),
at www.ita.doc.gov/media/STEEL726.htm.
132. See, e.g., Ukraine, U.S. Explore Restraint Agreement On Steel Imports, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Jan. 5, 2000 ("The Administration as recently as last week came under blistering
criticism from the domestic industry for its failure to provide import relief, as the LTV
Corporation, a major U.S. operator of integrated mills, filed for bankruptcy Dec. 29.").
Id.
133. See THOMAS R. HOWELL ET AL., supra note 116, at 55.

134. See id. at 95-96.
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time to reorganize its steel industries. Moreover, in 1980, the
European Community declared a state of manifest crisis, imposed mandatory production quotas on many steel products,
and fined any company that produced steel in excess of the
quota or undercut the legal minimum price. 135 These measures
remained in place until 1988 and were reintroduced in a more
limited way between 1992 and 1994. Such measures helped the
European Community survive the steel crisis of the 1970s and
1980s. As reviewed previously, the EC has seen a spate of trade
cases and has established various bilateral arrangements in the
last decade to deal with the latest crisis caused by excess capacity.
f. Worldwide
The crisis in the steel industry is not limited to the United
States and the European Community. The structural excess capacity situation is global in scope, affecting producers worldwide. Virtually all countries are affected by the steel situation in
one form or another. The number of trade cases involving steel
arising over the past few years is illuminating. Consider the following examples:
1. INDIA: In the first half of 2000, India completed a round
of anti-dumping cases on seamless tube from Austria, the
Czech Republic, Romania, the Russian Federation, and
the Ukraine, and also had outstanding anti-dumping duty
orders on hot rolled coils from Russia and the
Ukraine.136
2. CANADA: Under the auspices of its countervailing duty
law, Canada investigated stainless steel round bars imported from Brazil and India, and hot-rolled carbon steel
plates from India, Indonesia, and Thailand. 1 37 Canada
also had a wide variety of investigations, orders or undertakings in place on various steel mill products from Brazil, Cuba, Finland, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak
Republic, Thailand, Turkey, the Ukraine, the United
States, Venezuela, the People's Republic of China, Tai135. See Thomas R. Howell & Brent L. Bartlett, THE NEW CRISIS IN STEEL, supra
note 113, at 35.
136. Committee on Anti-DumpingPratices,Semi-Annual Report and Article 16.4 of the
Agreement-India, G/ADP/N/65/IND (Sept. 19, 2000).
137. Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Semi-Annual Report and
Article 25.11 of the Agreement-Canada, G/SCM/N/62/CAN/Rev.1 (Oct. 24, 2000).

OPPORTUNITIES IN THE WTO

2000]

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

wan, Italy, Sweden, Spain, Mexico, and the United King138
dom.
VENEZUELA: Venezuela had anti-dumping orders on
seamed and seamless steel tubes and bars and rods of
non-alloy steel from Japan, on seamless steel tubes from
Romania, and on hot-rolled and cold-rolled flat products
from the 9 Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and the
13
Ukraine.
EUROPEAN UNION: The EU had dozens of steel cases, orders and/or undertakings under its anti-dumping and
countervailing duty laws on products from Bulgaria, the
People's Republic of China, Taiwan, Croatia, the Czech
Republic, India, Iran, Korea, Malaysia, Romania, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, the
Ukraine, and Yugoslavia. 140 Also, as shown by the Chart
in Attachment 1, the EU had various bilateral arrangements with various countries.
MExico: In the first half of 2000, under its countervailing
duty law, Mexico had undertakings and orders in effect
on various types of steel from Brazil and Venezuela and
anti-dumping duty orders in force on various steel products from Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Germany, Kazakhstan,
the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, the Ukraine,
the United States, and Venezuela.'
SOUTH AFRICA: South Africa has; anti-dumping orders
outstanding on various steel mill products from Korea,
142
Malaysia, the Russian Federation, and the Ukraine.
COLOMBIA: Colombia has investigations underway on
hot-rolled sheet from Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and the Ukraine, and orders outstanding on tin
plate from the Netherlands, cold-rolled sheet from Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and the Ukraine, and
bars and rods from the Russian Federation and Trinidad

138. Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, Semi-Annual Report under Article 16.4 of
the Agreement-Canada, G/ADP/N/65/CAN (Aug. 30, 2000).
139. Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, Semi-Annual Report under Article 16.4 of
the Agreement-Venezuela, G/ADP/N/65/VEN (Oct. 25 2000).
140. Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices,Semi-Annual Report under Article 16.4 of
the Agreement-European Communities-Corrigendum, G/ADP/N/65/EEC (Aug.
17, 2000); G/SCM/N/62/EEC (Nov. 9, 2000).
141. Committee on Subsidies and CountervailingMeasures, Semi-Annual Report under
Article 25.11 of the Agreement-Mexico, G/SCM/N/62/MEX (Sept. 22, 2000).
142. Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices,Semi-Annual Report under Article 16.4 of
the Agreement-South Africa, G/ADP/N/65/ZAF (Sept. 22, 2000).
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8.

9.

10.

11.

12.
13.

14.
15.

and Tobago.
BRAZIL: Brazil had investigations and/or orders on various steel mill products from Taiwan, France, Germany,
1 44
Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, South Africa, and Spain.
AUSTRALIA: Australia had investigations and/or orders on
certain steel
mill products from Thailand and the United
45
Kingdom. 1
EGYPT: Egypt had anti-dumping duty orders in effect on
bars from Latvia, Romania, Turkey, and
steel reinforcing
1 46
the Ukraine.
INDONESIA: Indonesia had anti-dumping duty orders in
effect on steel pipes from the People's Republic of China,
Japan, Korea, and Singapore, and on hot-rolled coil from
India. 4 7
KOREA: Korea had a price undertaking in place with the
148
Russian Federation on H-beams.
PERU: Peru had anti-dumping orders in effect on hot and
cold-rolled steels from the Russian Federation and the
49
Ukraine. 1
PHILIPPINES: The Philippines conducted an investigation
150
on steel mill products from Taiwan and Korea.
duty orSINGAPORE: Singapore imposed an anti-dumping
51

der on steel reinforcement bars from Turkey.'

Thailand had anti-dumping duty 52orders in ef1
fect on H-sections from Korea and Poland.
17. TURKEY: Turkey had anti-dumping duty investigations
16.

THAILAND:

143. Committee on Anti-DumpingPractices, Semi-Annual Report under Article
the Agreement-Colombia, G/ADP/N/65/COL (Sept. 25, 2000).
144. Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, Semi-Annual Report under Article
the Agreement-Brazil, G/ADP/N/65/BRA (Aug. 1, 2000).
145. Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, Semi-Annual Report under Article
the Agreement-Australia, G/ADP/N/65/AUS Ouly 13, 2000).
146. Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices,Semi-Annual Report under Article
the Agreement-Egypt, G/ADP/N/65/EGY (Aug. 24 2000).
147. Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, Semi-Annual Report under Article
the Agreement-Indonesia, G/ADP/N/65/IDN (Sept. 1, 2000).
148. Committee on Anti-DumpingPractices, Semi-Annual Report under Article
the Agreement-Korea, G/ADP/N/65/KOR (Aug. 3, 2000).
149. Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, Semi-Annual Report under Article
the Agreement-Peru, G/ADP/N/65/PER (Sept. 20, 2000).
150. Committee on Anti-DumpingPractices, Semi-Annual Report under Article
the Agreement-Philippines, G/ADP/N/65/PHL (Sept. 21, 2000).
151. Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices,Semi-Annual Report under Article
the Agreement-Singapore, G/ADP/N/65/SGP (Aug. 24, 2000).
152. Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices,Semi-Annual Report under Article
the Agreement-Thailand, G/ADP/N/65/THA (Aug. 1, 2000).

16.4 of
16.4 of
16.4 of
16.4 of
16.4 of
16.4 of
16.4 of
16.4 of
16.4 of
16.4 of
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Moldova, the Russian
and/or orders on steel billets 1from
53
Federation, and the Ukraine.
18. UNITED STATES: The United States had anti-dumping
duty investigations, orders or suspension agreements,
countervailing duty investigations, orders or suspension
agreements and/or safeguard actions on a wide variety of
steel mill products from several countries; these include:
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil,
Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, India, Italy, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Malaysia, Mexico, Moldova, Netherlands, the People's Republic of
China, Philippines, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, Singapore, the Slovak Republic, South Africa,
Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Taiwan, Turkey, the Ukraine,
United Kingdom, and Venezuela.1 54 The U.S. also had a
negotiated arrangement with the Russian Federation on a
full range of products and was, at the beginning of 2001,
in negotiations with the Ukraine for a comprehensive
package. 155
Although not exhaustive, this list demonstrates the extraordinary
problems facing all major steel producing nations due to the serious imbalance between global supply and demand.
2. Global Rules Should Be Established to Deal With Structural
Excess Capacity
Although countries provide temporary measures to respond
to problems such as those experienced globally by the steel industry, such nations remain unable to effectively resolve the underlying problem of structural excess capacity. In steel, there
has been a nearly continual crisis since the 1970s. The multilateral trading system provides effective procedures to respond to
periodic excess capacity. The experiences of industries suffering
structural excess capacity, such as steel and aluminum, suggest,
however, that the establishment of multilateral rules for restor153. Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, Semi-Annual Report under Article 16.4 of
the Agreement-Turkey, G/ADP/N/65/TUR (Aug. 30, 2000).
154. See, e.g., Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Semi-Annual Report under Article 25.11 of the Agreement-United States, G/SCM/N/62/USA (Sept.
21, 2000); Committee on Anti-DumpingPractices, Semi-Annual Report under Article 16.4 of
the Agreement-United States, G/ADP/N/65/USA (Oct. 6, 2000); Report (2000) of the
Committee on Safeguards, G/L/409 (Nov. 23, 2000).
155. See Ukraine, U.S. Explore RestraintAgreement On Steel Imports, INSIDE U.S. TRADE,
Jan. 5, 2000.
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ing equilibrium would result in significantly less stress on the system, less destruction of economically efficient operations, and a
quicker return to sustainable competition.
It is not the purpose of this Essay to outline what the rules
should be for effectively addressing structural excess capacity.
The WTO would do well to encourage input from as many industries and Member governments as possible. Such dialogue
would encourage a broader understanding of the range of situations that excess capacity develops, and the types of rules that
might result in an expeditious and favorable return to normal
WTO situations. Considering the WTO's, World Bank's, and the
IMF's ability to coordinate, any rules addressing global excess
capacity should include opportunities for creative solutions and
coordinated actions in an effort to modernize, and develop infrastructure projects reducing the magnitude or timing of capacity reductions. Rules should also include steps leading to a feasible resolution of the problem on terms acceptable to the world.
Hopefully, Members of the WTO will not miss the opportunity
presented by this current crisis to address this important issue
either within a new Round, or as a separate matter on an expedited basis.
CONCLUSION
The trading system has undergone some dramatic challenges since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the
launch of the World Trade Organization. By and large, the existing rules system and the dispute process has been able to address many of the stresses in the system. Problems have arisen
from the construction of obligations under Article XIX of GATT
1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards and with certain aspects
of the functioning of the dispute settlement system, that should
be addressed as part of a new Round or separately.
In other major rules areas, such as anti-dumping and subsidies, there is much technical work to do to ensure full implementation of obligations and/or exercise of rights. While not
exciting to many, the notification exercise, vetting of laws and
regulations, and other regular business of the committees is of
great importance for the trading system and the securing of all
benefits negotiated. Where Member nations are having trouble
complying with notification requirements, technical assistance

2000]
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should be provided either from the WTO or from individual
Members. No major problems have been identified that would
warrant a re-examination of the agreements themselves at the
present time.
Finally, the trading system has an opportunity to increase
likely future liberalization by addressing several areas, either as
part of the built-in agenda (rules for perishable agriculture), as
part of a new round or otherwise (structural excess capacity)
that are not presently adequately addressed.
Where rules do not address the market realities in ways that
Member nations can accept, the result is an inevitable balking at
the pace of liberalization and the search for ad hoc solutions to
address pressing needs. The W'TO, and GATT before it, have
recognized the need to have a solid rules-based system for expanding trade liberalization. As we stand at the front end of the
21st century, it is critical that the WIO strengthen its rules and
reaffirm the important role rules play in encouraging the furtherance of trade liberalization.
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